



Behind the Pixels: Social Silencing and Isolation of Indian Muslims in the Online Public: A Report Summary

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This is a summary of the report titled “Behind the Pixels: Social Silencing and Isolation of Indian Muslims in the Online Public” released by Bebaak Collective in May 2024. This summary focuses on the sections of the report that document the role of social media in propagating anti-Muslim hate and violence in contemporary India causing widespread loneliness, isolation and withdrawal of victims from societal and professional engagements.

Introduction: Economies of Online Hate

The twenty-first-century internet and technology boom began with the idea of a free internet accessible to all. It held a promise of functioning as a democratic space beyond state or corporate control. Instead, this supposedly ‘free internet’ has enabled the propagation of hate against Muslims, women, Dalits, and queer-trans people. Reports by the United Nations and many organisations show that Islamophobia is more prevalent on the web than in offline life. It is fuelling a vicious cycle, where online expressions of hate incite offline attacks on Muslims, which in turn provoke more online hate. According to a report by Umar Butler, 85 per cent of all anti-Muslim posts are from India, the US, and the UK, and 55.12 per cent of Islamophobic tweets originate from India (Butler 2022). Research suggests that “...market and technological dynamics of the new media...” have intensified the “...climate of suspicion and antagonism to the religious other...” (Udupa 2015). Hence, it is important to understand firstly, how free speech on the

free internet enables hate speech and secondly how the narrative of hate and ‘otherising’ Muslims, becomes the dominant narrative.

Muslim women’s voices have been historically repressed by either the state or the community. In the digital age, the internet and social media serve as critical avenues for women to express their thoughts and opinions, transcending the limitations of physical public spaces. The internet started as a space for progressive politics, identity assertion, feminist conversations, and political organising. Feminists, leftists, progressives, and queers, became vulnerable to the marketing strategies of data corporations who sold the narrative of ‘freedom of expression’ recognising the need for the same among the mentioned groups. On one hand, the internet was making strides towards lofty ideals of freedom and universal accessibility, simultaneously, the technology companies accelerated their profit-driven ventures, trapping these voices into a privatised section of the internet that was inching towards surveillance capitalism¹ (Moawad, 2023). Over the past decade and a half, the internet has increasingly become dominated by class, caste, race, and gender hierarchies. In the garb of ‘neutrality of the market’, free internet enabled hate speech. Hate speech cannot come under the rubric of free speech; it constitutes a hate crime. According to Advocate Shahrukh Alam, hate speech is often regarded as ‘episodic’ (Alam 2022), a rare occurrence that is significant only if it disrupts law and order. Alam states it is imperative to distinguish between ‘hate speech’ and ‘offensive speech’. “Hate speech does not refer to offensive or foul-mouthed speech... it is speech that can cause actual material harm through the social, economic and political marginalisation of a community” (Alam 2022). Alam further highlights that hate speech aims to inflict harm, leading to systemic discrimination and ‘eventual political marginalisation of a community’ (Alam 2022). Recognising this distinction is critical in legal and

1 Understanding the concept of ‘surveillance capitalism’ requires an examination of data protection and cybersecurity laws and policies in the country. The idea of data protection originally aimed to empower users with control over their data. However, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 does not give individuals control over their data. Instead, the government and Big Tech companies enjoy a lot of protection to access and mine the data. The 2023 Act states, ‘the central government may exempt government agencies from the application of certain provisions in the interest of specified grounds such as security of the state, public order, and prevention of offences’ (Data Protection Act 2023). Hence, Data Protection Act emerges not so much as a tool to protect users’ rights but as a framework to regulate the use of personal data by the government and Big Tech companies and also to shield them from liability.

political discourses, particularly concerning the systemic harm hate speech against marginalised communities like Muslims.

Documenting Anti-Muslim Digital Hate

Methodology

This research followed feminist qualitative research methodology. It is based on interviews conducted with the survivors of digital hate and social workers, grassroots activists, journalists, and students who use social media for personal, professional, and political work. It draws and builds on the experiential knowledge of the research participants. The standpoints of being a Muslim and/or being a woman have been important when exploring the landscape of digital hate. Being qualitative, the research draws on primary data through in-depth interviews and group discussions. The findings in this report are based on semi-structured interviews with 18 individuals and four group discussions. The total number of interviewees was 34, including individual and group interviewees. Respondents belonged to a wide age range, from the mid-20s (12), 30s (10), 40s (8), and 50s-60s (4). Among the individual interviewees, there were twelve women and six men. The approach of individual in-depth interviews was selected due to its suitability to study such a sensitive issue. A high degree of confidentiality was made possible by creating an intimate setting for interactions. Two group discussions were held with grassroots activists, social workers, students, and journalists in Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh. A third group discussion was held with young people who were part of the anti-CAA-NRC-NPR movement in Delhi, and the fourth was with a young group of social workers from West Bengal. The group discussions helped to understand the political climate in the regional context and also in cross-professional exchange regarding the experiences of social media hatred.

The interviews and group discussions were conducted between November 2022 and September 2023. All interviews and discussions were transcribed and anonymised for qualitative analysis. The research participants were assigned initials in the report to protect their identity. The research participants were identified through the network of Bebaak Collective, an autonomous feminist organisation working with the Muslim community in western and northern India

since 2013. This article is a discussion based on the findings of the online hate and violence experienced by Muslim women activists, social workers, journalists and students who have been physically implicated in the sexualised nature of online hatred and violence.

Nature of anti-Muslim digital hate

The nature of social media apps and the digital space provides anonymity and non-accountability, which makes it easier for hatred and abuse to generate more traffic. The inadequacy of mechanisms to enforce ethics or protocols to hold perpetrators accountable contributes to hatred and violence becoming rampant. Some of the typical characteristics of the nature of anti-Muslim online hate include bullying, threats, shaming, manipulation and demonization. Respondents shared that bullying and threats have become common in offline and online spaces especially when the profile is distinctly in a Muslim name. The abuse shifts entirely to the religious-cultural identity, whether it is a Muslim man or a woman. The most common threat and insult is regarding the citizenship of Muslims in India. Treating Muslims as outsiders and asking them to leave the country is common in digital spaces. This 'othering' questions their citizenship and hints that staying in India may not be safe. This perception of Muslims as 'open or closet Pakistanis' (Pandey 1999) is a 'suspicion' carried since Partition. Muslims are expected to be meek, stay silent, have no opinions, be invisible, and not exercise their fundamental rights. They are repeatedly taught what to eat, 'how to behave, how to present themselves in public places, to restrain their Muslim feelings, and to "normalize" themselves' in the 'new India' (Jha 2018). In the popular narrative of "*love jihad*," Muslim men are accused of sexual violence and coercion by Hindu women. Online social groups are created to spread fear and target people in inter-faith relationships. Young Muslim girls and boys are constantly surveilled within the community. The polarisation today has reached a climax where one is also surveilled by friends and peers. Whether in the name of protecting Hindu women by setting up anti-Romeo squads in Uttar Pradesh (Verma 2023) or by issuing a Government Regulation to monitor inter-faith marriages in Maharashtra in 2022 (Khan and Arati 2023), majoritarian forces have been usurping rights guaranteed by law and the Constitution.

Shaming and manipulation are other common tactics. Young Muslim men are always targeted regarding their physical appearance, with derogatory terms like '*Bulli Katwa*'² being used to imply that they are effeminate and emasculated due to their religious practices or cultural background. Another common saying is '*Har Muslim mard halala ke pichehain*' / Every Muslim man is after a woman behind halal.³ This is also to portray them as inherently violent and backward. The demonisation of Muslim identity through misinformation has become another common experience. Social media platforms are rife with stereotypes and abuses. One of the respondents shared that the demonisation of the Muslim identity is not new. But it has got a face of its own today. Whether it is an activist, a politician, a journalist, a social worker, or a student, if it is a Muslim person, the risks of being labelled anti-national, terrorist, and seditious do not take much time. Some of the very common verbal abuses based on stereotypes include '*Jihadi*' / terrorist, '*Halalaki Paydayish*' / child of second, third, fourth wife of a man (this kind of verbal abuse is directed to any Muslim, stigmatising the entire community as patriarchal and regressive), '*Burqewali Hasina*' / Muslim woman as terrorist, '*Kala Gilaf*' / black headscarf-wearing woman, '*Musalmaan Auratein Bachha Paida karneki Machine hain*' / Muslim woman as reproductive machine (to name a few).

Further, one witnessed a different kind of Islamophobia and violence on social media during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was directed at Muslims and stigmatised them as spreaders of the disease. The mainstream media, for the large part, demonised Muslims by framing it as 'Corona Jihad' (Hussain 2020). Using the Tablighi Jamat congregation in Delhi, the media minted misinformation to spread hatred and panic (Hussain 2020). There were riots in different cities and suburbs after the Tablighi Jamat incident. The kind of othering, untouchability, and 'spatial segregation' practised during the pandemic 'impaired Muslims' access to livelihoods, space, education, healthcare and relief' (Khan, Zainab and

2 A derogatory term used by some individuals to refer to Muslims.

3 This kind of verbal abuse is directed to any Muslim women, stigmatising the entire community as patriarchal and regressive

Zainab 2021) with social media playing a big role in spreading hatred, suspicion and violence very quickly. The hijab ban in Karnataka sparked another kind of communal polarisation and a specific kind of hatred directed at Muslim girls and the community. It picks up the hijab as its battleground to propagate religious and social hatred. Students could not attend classes and give their exams due to wearing headscarves. Further, the Karnataka High Court ultimately identified hijab as religious clothing and banned it from educational spaces. The Court verdict nullified the decisive fight put up by each girl. The hijab as a religious garment was not the central battle. The fight was about the dignity and fundamental rights of these girls, who had the Constitutional right to wear religious-cultural clothing and claim access to institutional and public places. Such a struggle was declared null and void. Further, the familiarity of harassers, in many cases school friends, neighbours, and colleagues made it difficult to build resistance against such online harassment. Respondents reflected on how friends and familiar faces have changed with time because of an environment of hatred and indoctrination. Most respondents shared how they have lost friends, and colleagues in social media disputes and how difficult the journey has been. People whom they believed to be their support network and trusted circle behaved differently and were indifferent to the violence happening to the Muslim community. They were convinced that Muslim people were miscreants, responsible for economic downfall and communal divisions. The fear and hatred created by familiar people are even more striking as they typically harm and destroy childhood friendships and local acquaintance networks. Muslim journalists shared how being trolled, receiving communal slurs, and gendered abuse have become routine. The abuse has resulted in them changing the way they interact with the online public. For example, they have stopped personal sharing on social media and only use social media for professional work. But even there, they had to be meticulous about what to post and how. Respondents also shared that the hijab controversy in Karnataka started with the spreading of misinformation and hatred on social media apps. Students reported that overnight, their non-Muslim teachers and friends started calling them terrorists and distanced themselves. People with whom one shared classroom spaces changed, and the environment changed dramatically. Further, sexual hate crimes in digital spaces include rampant rape threats and sexual abuse. They present a formidable challenge, demanding specific strategies to safely navigate digital spaces. In early 2021, an app called

‘Desi Sulli Deals’ appeared on an open-source GitHub platform, where photos of many Muslim women were stolen from their social media profiles, doctored, and put up for ‘auction.’ A similar incident recurred with another app called ‘Bulli Bai’ on 1 January 2022. A survivor of the ‘Bulli Bai’ app expressed, ‘As a Muslim woman in India, I am not new to Islamophobia or anti-Muslim narratives and hate. “From outrightly being denied houses on rent because of my religious identity to workplace Islamophobia and hate... this was a new low.” (Salim 2022). Many Muslim women have faced threats of rape, hate speech, sexual abuse, and trolling on social media. Moreover, being objectified, sexualised on social media, and receiving physical life threats have been common occurrences as well. However, being targeted as a community, with many women’s photos doxed, morphed, and circulated through these apps, presented a new scale of violence. The names and profiles of Muslim women immediately viral through social and even electronic media as the most sensual and heated topic. Respondents described it as the most humiliating and denigrating experience they had encountered.

c. Relationship between online and offline violence

This intertwining of online and offline violence against Muslims reflects the broader issue of escalating anti-Muslim sentiment in the country. This phenomenon is not limited to virtual spaces but also permeates physical environments. The frequency of incidents such as lynching, property damage, and targeted violence against Muslims underscores the ease with which such acts occur in physical spaces. Every respondent felt that online violence is a manifestation of what is happening in the offline physical space across the country. In other words, online hatred and violence are inextricably linked to offline violence. Respondents believe that both online and offline violence influence each other, but the source of the online hatred and violence is somewhere in offline spaces. Participants of this research recognise the blurring of online and offline violence as an intentional tactic. These are interconnected facets of a larger systemic problem. For instance, they highlighted the sudden trolling and abuse of Muslim individuals who have minimal online presence, indicative of a pervasive surveillance and harassment apparatus. The blurring of boundaries between these spaces underscores the

systemic nature of anti-Muslim violence. The erosion of trust extended beyond institutions to encompass social circles, as individuals feel increasingly vulnerable to surveillance and targeting. The situation has become such that one cannot trust beyond a close group of friends, colleagues, and family members with whom one shares some like-mindedness. The systematic ghettoisation of Muslims on social media mirrors ghettoisation in the physical public spaces. The only difference between violence and hatred in offline and online space is that the former is executed in immediacy and the latter keeps on building for a longer time and may lead to physical attack. In other words, the violence on social media is more structural. It builds up with time, leading to immediate harm. It is a matter of time difference, anonymity, immediacy, and psychological impact that differentiates online and offline hatred and violence. Here, the concept of embodied data, thus, becomes important in the context. Scholars like Kovacs and Ranganathan (2019) emphasise that data is intricately linked to our physical selves. Our online presence, shaped by social media and internet usage, is stored in algorithms accessible only to internet companies and governments. This data can be exploited for surveillance and spreading misinformation, hatred, harassment, and abuse. One lives with the insecurity that one's embodied data is controlled and surveilled by state apparatus and dominant groups and institutions, restricting and violating our bodies, infringing upon our autonomy and freedom of movement, and constraining our actions and personal liberties. Further, digital hate crimes, are not considered serious violations as law enforcement looks at data as 'disembodied and de-territorialised.' There is a lack of understanding that the most intimate parts of our lives are subject to datafication. Data misuse is seen as a 'violation of data privacy,' which is defined as having control over one's data. Such a policy framework aims to protect 'personal data and not bodies that generate data' (Radhakrishnan 2020). Recognising data as an extension of our bodies would allow for reconceptualising data misuse as a violation of bodily integrity, warranting more stringent laws (Van der Ploeg 2012). By centring bodily integrity, feminist principles can be applied to rethink consent frameworks and data protection policies (Kovacs and Jain 2020). The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 shows a lack of recognition that data is embodied. Instead, it serves as a new form of censorship, a tool to legalise data mining rather than safeguarding the right to privacy. Our bodies encompass not only flesh, blood, organs, and emotions but also data, which is a significant realisation that

is undermined by the data protection law. As ‘digitisation’ and ‘datafication’ (Kovacs 2022) reshape our lives, women – particularly Muslim women – queer, trans, and intersex people face heightened risks in everyday reality.

Impact of Digital Hate and Violence

The fundamental characteristic of digital hate and violence is its psychological impact, manifested as constant fear. This fear often stems from the unknown and intangible nature of the threat, existing primarily in the virtual realm. However, the virtual world is as real and impactful as the offline world. The incessant attack, humiliation, and degradation in online spaces affect the morale, sense of safety and well-being of a person. The responses from the respondents adversely impact confidence and the ability to engage socially, politically, and emotionally. Journalist respondents shared that keeping the phone numbers of editors, lawyers, and friends with family members in anticipation of them being targeted; has become normal. Government reports later in 2022 stated that thousands of young women dropped out of school and college due to the court verdict of the hijab ban in Karnataka.

Some respondents from upper-caste, educated, middle-class families talked about their parents’ worries about their activities, the protests they attended, and their public speaking. Police repression of students and activists during the anti-CAA-NRC-NPR movement and COVID-19 lockdown in various forms have only made people more anxious and fearful. The worry, anxiety, and concern, in many instances, manifest as physical restrictions, with parents or family members often restricting women from going to protests or being active online, especially on social media. State and institutional surveillance thus influences surveillance and censorship from the family, community, and society. This kind of surveillance is also called ‘lateral surveillance’ (Andrejevik, 2004), carried out by individuals rather than public or private institutions at a social level with or without the help of technology. The immediate backlash of online violence against women is family surveillance, where parents and family members try to restrict or dictate movements. Respondents wanted to keep their social and digital lives separate, seeking to avoid parental intervention. While the family and community are sources of surveillance and censorship for young adults,

conversely, individuals also struggle to protect family, friends, and dear ones. Some respondents expressed constant fear of offline surveillance, including the possibility of being physically tracked. From online conversations, there is always a fear of phone numbers and locations being hacked and people turning up at home. So, the concern is not only about individual safety but extends to the fear of putting friends and family members in danger. Respondents feared for family members and friends who are not so politically active. Concern, love, and affection for family and friends deterred people from engaging in conversations online. People adopted this restriction for themselves and their loved ones. This restriction comes from a sense of responsibility and is not perceived as self-prescribed censorship. A respondent shared concerns about how being politically vocal on social media may have professional repercussions. It also endangers the lives of colleagues and friends. Ultimately, both the individual and their family are victims of a systematic and targeted strategy to disempower and exclude Muslims from social, economic, and political resources and power.

Participants shared that they employed various strategies to combat online hatred and violence. Adopting a low profile has become common, with some refraining from engaging in chat, commenting on posts and opting for individual messaging. Another tactic is maintaining anonymity by withholding personal details and religious or cultural identity. Blocking people when they become violent is another common practice. Some respondents have restricted their use of social media due to the polarised atmosphere and have restricted their social circle online. Others take on the role of observers, only reading and following posts to avoid backlash. Fear of being attacked and being subjected to psychological harm often leads to passive use of social media. Choosing a profession with limited use of social media, such as academia, was another approach noted by a respondent. In academia, the complex language and theoretical arguments provide some protection against online vitriol, though the field is not immune to digital abuse. One respondent opined how Twitter, crucial for academic work, exposes scholars to public scrutiny, surveillance and trolling due to its open nature. Unlike Facebook and Instagram, where one can choose followers, Twitter is a very different space; thus, the risks become higher. Another respondent observed that Twitter as a platform is very immediate, and one has to be constantly wary about what others post and how they respond. High follower counts increase the risk of

trolling and attention to controversial opinions. Hence, vigilance, hesitation and measured response are tactics adopted for survival.

Online sexual violence has a tremendous impact on mental health. The commodification and auctioning portrayed Muslim women only as sexual beings, robbing them of their agency, bodily integrity, and humanity. Though the violence was in the online space, as discussed, it can rapidly transform into physical risk and psychological trauma. As is common with physical violence or a communal riot, even in the case of online sexual violence, the survivor is left with the fear of 'hypervigilance' or a 'heightened sense of alertness' (Khan, G.M. and Zainab 2022) and constant anticipating further violence. This fear originates from the constant slander, abuse, and humiliation in the digital world. It is a cumulative fear. It accumulates because it is not only one specific incident targeted at one individual but is a daily hatred encountered by members of the community. It is a collective fear. Any incident of violence in the Muslim community adds to the baggage of trauma. The intersectional identities of being a Muslim and a woman play a critical role in this narrative, highlighting the impact of digital hate. This fear thus leads to a feeling of hopelessness and withdrawal from all activities. One realises an inability to address the issue at an individual level. Consequently, mental health issues such as depression and withdrawal from daily activities are common. Such withdrawal affects various aspects, including career, social and political engagement. This narrative underscores the fragile mental health of a person trying to adjust to social and academic spaces. It points out the hatred, hyper-vigilance and communalisation of campus spaces. It brings forth how belonging to the Muslim community subjects one to labels, especially in today's polarised political scenario, where speaking out on issues pertaining to the community can be deemed "communal". In an atmosphere of heightened animosity towards Muslims and attempts to pit marginalised groups against each other, backlash often targets those most stigmatised. Engaging in political activities becomes challenging when one's identity is repeatedly attacked.

Loneliness and isolation as a result of losing friends due to social media activism is a common experience, with debates over nationalism, patriotism, and protecting India's image often sparking endless feuds. Those who take critical stances are frequently isolated, putting friendships to the test. In one instance,

a respondent was pressured by both her friends and the police to take down a post. This moral and psychological strain shows how solitary the battle is, leaving individuals with only a handful of trusted supporters. Online violence exacerbates this loneliness as it often goes unrecognised as a crime. Participants in the case of online sexual abuse often express a distinct loneliness, fearing being labelled and ostracised. Many times, the fear remains unexpressed, leading to profound psychological impacts such as low self-esteem and a sense of worthlessness. While the immediate trauma heals with mental health support, it leaves behind lingering fear and low self-confidence. Societal reaction aggravates this trauma as many people fail to understand online sexual violence, resulting in self-blame and guilt. Navigating such experiences, even collectively, proves challenging, as the participants alluded to progressive groups struggling to build a support system. The pervasive sense of not belonging intensifies, leading to isolation and alienation among survivors of digital hate and violence across personal, social, and political spheres.

Experiences with police and public institutions cause further alienation of victims. Like with offline sexual and gendered violence, in cases of online sexual violence also, the survivors face widespread shaming and blaming. The ordeal persists beyond the initial incident as the survivors face harassment and social boycotts in both offline and online spaces, including courts and police stations. In one instance in a village in Uttar Pradesh, a schoolteacher was fired from her job for participating in the anti-CAA-NRC protests, which became public through videos shared online. She did not get a job anywhere else after that. Such overt discrimination is exacerbated by the online dissemination of people's whereabouts, resulting in social boycotts and harassment prevalent in institutional and political spheres. People are deliberately isolated, with no resources to fight back. The police often act reluctantly, many times asking the survivor to delete their profile and posts. They do not want to take action against the perpetrator. The tendency is to blame the survivor for the online harassment. There is generally no outcome in complaints against cyberbullying and online violence. Additionally, the police bias against Muslims, evident through Islamophobic sentiments openly articulated, further hinders the registration of complaints. A social worker responded and shared that when she went to file a complaint regarding communal hatred in the neighbourhood, the response from

the police was to make her own community understand what is right and wrong and not further spread the Coronavirus. It is explicit here, that the complainant, a young woman, was not able to access justice but faced institutional violence from the police machinery. This attitude of the police indicates that the Muslim community cannot hope for any legal justice. It shows how the police system is biased and influenced by majoritarian sentiments and ideology. Instead of taking action, the police serve as a surveillance system for the complainant, which the complainant has to pass to access social justice. One has to keep explaining and proving to the police how they are facing verbal and sexual violence. The police perception of data is limited to personal information being misused rather than the harm inflicted on the person. That it is not only a matter of personal privacy but there is a threat to material harm through embodied data, not understood by the law enforcement system. Many respondents noted that political and progressive organisations failed to recognise the potential for damage by psychological threats. Lack of solidarity, political allyship and constantly enduring violence and humiliation on social media causes overwhelming fatigue and stress. There is also a question of why one community must constantly prove its courage and resilience. The burden of proving bravery, political awareness, and resilience disproportionately falls on the Muslim community, leading to further exhaustion experienced by individuals. As a society, we lack adequate support systems, and the democratic rights movement has failed to create alternative structures of support. Besides legal interventions, the creation of support and solidarity groups is essential to address the hatred and violence pervasive in digital and offline spaces. A respondent noted the trivialisation of online violence, citing an incident where a political organisation suggested that she wear it as a “badge of honour” during the GitHub incidents. This attitude suggests that experiencing online hatred establishes one as a true rebel. Simultaneously, online sexual abuse is dismissed as non-violent, particularly by men in political circles. The perception of online sexual violence as remote and disembodied, without any material impact, is the reason behind such trivialisation. It also stems from the lack of drawing connections between digital and offline activism. Bridging the intergenerational divide between those engaged in these forms of activism is challenging but necessary for understanding and addressing the potential risks and harms associated with online violence. Another respondent criticised civil society groups for their limited awareness and engagement with the rapidly

changing world of politics and violations happening across online and offline spaces. Some older organizations do not usually engage with digital space and fail to comprehend the kind of everyday hatred and violence that encapsulates it. Consequently, there is sometimes a significant gap between older and newer organisations in understanding contemporary manifestations of anti-Muslim hate and gendered violence. This disparity contributes to a lack of political solidarity, with fewer organised efforts to respond to violence and crises in today's world.

This report is significant as it highlights that Indian Muslims live in a state where they feel excluded and abandoned by legal and institutional structures as well as slandered by increasing communal sentiments that have a profound impact on the day-to-day life and mental health of individuals and the community as a whole. Hatred and violence at the individual level impede social interaction and integration causing widespread loneliness and isolation. The report details the way forward making a strong case for overcoming the same through the dismantling of a culture of hatred and strengthening existing social-political support systems as well as better access to justice.

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