



M.A. POLITICS
SEMESTER - III (CBCS)

INDIA'S
NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

SUBJECT CODE: 99166

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M.A. POLITICS
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INDIA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
SYLLABUS

- 1. Evolution** **(15 Hours)**
 - a) India's Neighbourhood Policy During Congress period
 - b) India's Neighbourhood Policy During Non Congress, Gujaral Doctrine
 - c) Nuclearisation and Neighbourhood Policy

- 2. India and It's Neighbour- I** **(15 Hours)**
 - a) China
 - b) Pakistan, Afghanistan
 - c) Sri Lanka

- 3. India and It's Neighbour- II** **(15 Hours)**
 - a) Bangladesh
 - b) Nepal, Bhutan
 - c) Myanmar

- 4. Bilateral Issues** **(15 Hours)**
 - a) Land and Maritime Boundary Issue
 - b) Water Sharing Issue
 - c) Cross Border Terrorism, Migration and Terrorism

Readings:

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EVOLUTION

Unit Structure :

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- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Evolution
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 - 1.2.2 India's Neighbourhood Policy during Non-Congress, Gujral Doctrine
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- 1.4 India's and It's Neighbour-II
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 - 1.5.3 Cross Border Terrorism, Migration and Terrorism
- 1.6 Summary
- 1.7 Reference

1.0 OBJECTIVES

The objective of this unit is to critically analyze the relations of India with its South Asian neighbours, viz Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, China, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Myanmar. The relationship has been examined from different perspectives, covering political, economic, and other bilateral issues.

After studying this unit, you should be able to:

- Explain how India's foreign policy evolved toward its neighbouring countries.
- Congress and Non-Congress eras of foreign policy doctrine.
- Understand nuclearization and neighbourhood policy.

- Explain the country-wise analysis, categorized into two parts: neighbour-I and neighbour-II.
- Critically analyze India's policy toward its neighbours; and identify the key issues that strain India's bilateral relations with its neighbours.

1.1 INTRODUCTION: INDIA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Foreign policy is influenced by a country's history, culture, political system, and other elements, like geography and natural borders, some of them are constants, while others, like the domestic and external environment, change frequently. As India's former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee once famously remarked (Vajpayee 2003), "You can change friends but not Neighbours".

India is a distinct geographic entity. It's a shared border with countries of different sizes, power, and resources. Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are all included in this group. With the rise of multipolar international politics, India must establish long-term relationships between its domestic and foreign policy goals. India's political and economic progress is highly dependent on a secure and peaceful environment.

Since its independence in 1947, India's principle challenges have included promoting internal cohesion and managing its often-troubled relations with its neighbours. S.D. Muni notes that India's policy towards its immediate neighbours is likely to face severe challenges from internal turbulence in those countries and India itself, as has been the case with Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. In the current foreign policy of India is the biggest concern about the economic expansion of China in South Asia. India has been continuously facing Chinese intervention in both land area and maritime zone area since 1962.

India maintains political, historical, economic, and cultural connections with its neighbours based on sovereignty and mutual respect. India's foreign policy seeks to protect political independence and external security.

1.2. EVOLUTION

One of the remarkable developments in post-war international relations is the independence of many countries, around two-thirds of the present membership of the United Nations. Among these, the role of independent India is perhaps the most significant. India's foreign policy was established by Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs. While the foreign policy, as outlined by Nehru in September 1946, there were shifts in the country, both during the time of Nehru and of his successors.

India has failed to build strong neighbourhood ties despite its proximity and historical, religious, economic, ethnic, and cultural ties to neighbouring

states. While SAARC has given India a platform to communicate with its near neighbours, and frequent head-of-state visits are usual, a "feeling of neglect" remains in the area (Behuria, Pattanaik, and Gupta 2012). India focuses on managing its ties with its neighbours rather than influencing them with a long-term strategy (Behuria, Pattanaik, and Gupta, 2012).

Contemporary Indian foreign policy is focused mainly on promoting economic interests, India's graduation to the high table of international relations, and most consistently since its independence, on enhancing its security within its immediate neighbourhood, approaches that have evolved over the decades (Malone, 2011).

1.2.1 India's Neighbourhood Policy During Congress period

After the independence India's foreign policy first protect India's sovereignty from the super-power politics, stay away from the block politics, and freedom of foreign policy which is popularly known as non-alignment, moreover it promotes decolonisation, South-South cooperation. At the same time, India was more focusing giving importance to neighbour countries. it is difficult to define particularly congress period foreign policy, but yes because of the long-time governed by the congress party that is way just for understanding it has broadly divided into congress and non-congress period. Let's understand India's Neighbourhood Policy during the congress period. During the 1950s and 1960s idealism has been the main driver of Indian foreign policy. The first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, was the leading architect of this policy. He focused on solving the problems at home, like making the country more independent and getting the economy going again. Nehru chose non-alignment because the Cold War had led to bipolar world order. He said that "India would have to plough a lonely furrow if it joined a side" (Appadorai, 1982).

India's loss to China in the Indo-Chinese border war of 1962 showed the unpleasant reality of world politics. After the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965, India's foreign policy was put to the test in a big way. This led to a shift toward adoption policies that put security as India's highest-ranked interest. Muni says that "India's approach to its neighbours is shaped in part by the styles and personalities of its diplomats". When Indira Gandhi came into power in 1966, she said that the problems of developing countries needed to be solved "not just by idealism, not just by sentimentalism, but by very clear thinking and a hard-headed analysis of the situation." (Appadorai, 1982). It can say within congress period from Nehru (1947-1964) to Indira Gandhi (1966-1977), we can see the shift from idealism to become realism.

Indira's regime marked a turning point in India's foreign policy, establishing it as a regional force in South Asia. Some of her foreign policy successes include the creation of Bangladesh (1971) and the assertion of Indian power in South Asia; normalizing relations with Pakistan via the Shimla Agreement (1972); improving relations with China; boundary and sea zone pacts with Sri Lanka (1974 and 1976); with Indonesia (1974) and Bangladesh (1974 by solving the Berubari union issue); friendship with

Iran; the merger of Sikkim as the 22nd state of the Indian Union (1975); and a robust nuclear deterrent.

1.2.2 India's Neighbourhood Policy during Non-Congress, Gujral Doctrine

The former Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, propounded the Gujral Doctrine when he was the Union Minister of External Affairs from 1996 to 1997 in the H.D. Deve Gowda Government. The Gujral doctrine was a five-point roadmap that sought to build trust between India and its neighbours, solve bilateral issues through bilateral talks, and remove immediate quid pro quos in the diplomatic relationship between India and her neighbours. In addition, the 'Doctrine' emphasized the importance of unilateral accommodation for friendly and warm relations with India's neighbours. I.K. Gujral formulated five principles to deal with the immediate neighbours of India. These principles are:

First, with neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust.

Second, no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country in the region.

Third, no country should interfere in the internal affairs of another.

And fourth, all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; and,

Finally, they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.

According to Gujral, these five principles, if scrupulously adhered to, would achieve a fundamental recasting of South Asia's regional relationships, including the problematic relationship between India and Pakistan. Further, implementing these principles would generate a climate of close and mutually benign cooperation in the region, where the weight and size of India are regarded positively as an asset by these countries (Murthy, 2008).

The Gujral Doctrine was essential because it showed India how important it was to have good relationships with its neighbours. It gave them a sense of direction and purpose, which will always be one of the goals of Indian foreign policy. The Gujral Doctrine is still relevant in India's current foreign policy dealing with its neighbours.

1.2.3 Nuclearization and Neighbourhood Policy

As Daniel Markey stated that, "Nuclear competition in Southern Asia represents a classic conundrum of international relations: enormously high stakes, conflicting and entrenched interests, and at least in the near term, few realistic avenues for mitigating threats." (Albert, 2015).

India is a hesitant nuclear power with a pacifist strategic culture inspired by Gandhi's nonviolence. However, India has territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed neighbours. India believes that nuclear weapons are political weapons, not weapons of war fighting.

Later India adopted nuclear weapons' "No First Use" (NFU) concept is significant and debatable in Indian foreign policy. In January 2003, the country's doctrine said that it would not use nuclear weapons first. However, there was a big catch: nuclear weapons could be used if there is the use of any biological or chemical weapons against India by the other countries. Indian diplomats, government spokespersons, and other strategists have often pointed to the NFU policy as proof that India is a responsible nuclear power.

On the other hand, there is a long history of strategists, military leaders, and, more recently, government officials questioning the NFU commitment or calling for it to be dropped. Different policymakers and government officials have said that their ideas about how nuclear weapons should be used do not fit the strict definition of an NFU policy. (Sundaram & Ramana, 2018).

After the nuclear test in 1998, when India said it was a nuclear weapon state, it also said that it would not use nuclear weapons first. India's nuclear policy was all about getting back at other countries. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) said on January 4, 2003, "Nuclear weapons will only be used in response to a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere." On the other hand, Pakistan has openly threatened India more than once with the use of nuclear weapons, and it has done this since the two countries were not even recognized as nuclear powers.

Because of the ongoing nuclear nexus between China and Pakistan, India is in a difficult position. Therefore, it is in India's best interest to seek out strategic partners that can support India politically and, if feasible, by giving technical support that does not violate treaty responsibilities to ensure nuclear deterrence.

1.3 INDIA'S AND IT'S NEIGHBOUR-I

1.3.1 China

On October 1, 1949, India became the first non-communist country to open an embassy in the People's Republic of China (PRC). On April 1, 1950, India and China established diplomatic relations. In 1954, the two countries jointly promulgated the "Panchsheel" (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence inspired by Buddha's philosophy). During the 1950 to 1958, India desired to cultivate friendship with China. At that time the slogan becomes extremely popular, "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" during the visits of Chou En-Lai to India.

India's largest and most crucial neighbour is China. We share a border with China that is about 4000 kilometres long, and a lot of it is disputed. China's phenomenal economic growth is one of the essential things in our time.

India-China relations have always been most watched by territorial claims and counterclaims and the war of 1962. India-China relations may be the observed relationship that will shape the Asian century and even world geopolitics.

The rise of China and the way it is showing off its power is making its neighbours nervous, from Japan to the ASEAN to the Central Asian Republics. India has been friends with China for over a thousand years.

China is now the world's second-largest economy. Because of this, China's military has become much more modern very rapidly. Therefore, it is in the best interests of both countries to keep the border area calm and peaceful. India and China have made the most high-level visits and signed the most agreements in the last ten years. Cooperation between India and China on global issues like climate change, global governance, and international trade has been good.

China is projecting its influence into India's neighbourhood as its comprehensive national power grows. It has provided Pakistan with critical strategic nuclear and missile technologies. Pakistan serves as a front for Pakistan's policy of threatening India and attempting to destabilize it within its region. China's economic engagement and arms transfers to India's other neighbours are also aimed at these countries.

1.3.3 Pakistan, Afghanistan

As part of its withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, Britain split it into India which consists of diverse religions with the majority of Hindu communities on August 15, 1947, and the majority of Muslim communities in Pakistan on August 14, 1947. The partition led to one of the most significant migrations of people ever seen and caused riots and violence.

The relationship between India and Pakistan is one of the most complicated that India has with any of its neighbours. However, India and Pakistan have made much progress in reducing their "trust deficit" over the past few years, even though they still have many disagreements.

Beyond the three major wars (1947/1948 - First, Second - 1965, Third - 1971) that have set the two countries against each other, border violence has raised in India from Pakistan several times, and domestic attacks in India from extremist groups in Pakistan such as Mumbai attack in November 2008. Without the collusion of the government in Islamabad, incidents sorely test the patience and restraint of the Indian nation and its government. Nevertheless, large-scale hostile relations have been avoided since 1971, and the nuclear weapons capacity of both countries may have rendered all-out war much more unlikely than in past decades.

The current hostile relationship between India and Pakistan results from the work of colonial masterminds. Successive Indian and Pakistani governments have attempted to negotiate and resolve outstanding problems, sometimes achieving limited if real success (for instance, with the World Bank's participation and assistance in the Indus Water Treaty of 1960), but

the overall relationship has never improved fundamentally for long. the two countries have reached numerous agreements on issues including the protection of nuclear facilities, bus services between Indian and Pakistani cities, human trafficking, illegal immigration, and the establishment of trade routes. There have also been two extensive discussions, formal and informal, over the Kashmir issue, with "track One" and "track Two" discussions. However, little ever seems to come of it due to the lack of trust between the two governments and political risk aversion in tackling their fundamental differences.

India wants to have peaceful, friendly, and working relationships with Pakistan. The two countries are linked by language, culture, geography, and economy, but politics and history complicate their relationship.

In January 1950, the then-Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the then-Ambassador of Afghanistan to India, Mohammad Najibullah, signed a five-year treaty of friendship.

India and Afghanistan have historically had strong bilateral relations, and India has welcomed Afghanistan to join SAARC (April 2007, 14th Summit). Moreover, Afghanistan is strategically significant for India's foreign policy. Therefore, India always maintains a good relationship with Afghanistan. During Operation Enduring Freedom, which was the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, India helped the Allied forces by giving them information and helping them with logistics. After the Taliban started falling, India set up diplomatic ties with the country's new civilian government and helped with relief and rebuilding efforts.

An unstable Afghanistan will also have a destabilizing impact on Pakistan. This will have implications for India's Pakistan policy also. In the 10-year scenario, India should maintain contact with all sides in Afghanistan and deepen people-to-people contacts but remain cautious about getting bogged down. This will open the field for the return of the Taliban (Chandra, 2012).

India's stance toward Afghanistan exemplified the contradiction between its goal of greater involvement in its north-western neighbourhood and its practical restrictions. At the end of 1979, India's failure to criticize the Soviet military operation in Afghanistan separated it from a sizeable portion of the Afghan population. The rise to power of the Islamist Taliban in the 1980s caused India great concern. India's first problem at the beginning of the 1990s was to pick up the pieces of its broken Afghanistan strategy (Malone, 2011, pp: 116).

India's strategic, economic, and security interests depend on how the current Afghan government keeps the Taliban at bay after the Biden administration pulls its military out of the region. Any political unrest in the area will affect the countries. Pakistan has helped the Taliban in the past, and it can do so again now. As long as the US military was there, it kept an eye on the most extreme groups and made it possible for India and Afghanistan to work together. The threat of terrorism: The withdrawal could lead to a rise in international and local terrorism, a return of the Taliban's power in Pakistan,

and political instability in the area. Extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are focused on India.

India is currently dealing with this region (Pakistan and Afghanistan) very carefully, making alliances with major powers like the USA, Japan, France, and Australia, and consolidating immediate neighbours through bilateral engagement and regional organizations like BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), SAARC, and MGC (Mekong Ganga Cooperation) for the security, and peaceful economic development in the South Asian Region.

1.3.4 Sri Lanka

The two countries (India and Sri Lanka) have been close since the beginning of recorded history in the subcontinent. Our relationship is strong because we have a shared cultural and socioeconomic history and have been in contact for thousands of years.

The connections go back to the era of the arrival of Buddhism. Buddhism as a movement expanded throughout Sri Lanka around 2000 years ago.

The north and northeast parts of Sri Lanka have been economically connected to India. The native inhabitants of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) were colonially under the British but were not a part of the British India Empire, being ruled independently. From the 1830s onwards, the British acquired indentured workers from India, mainly from Tamil Nadu to Ceylon. The Tamils, who were transferred by the British, settled in the northern section of Ceylon.

The prolonged conflict in Sri Lanka between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority has strained bilateral ties in recent decades. Even though the two countries used to get along swimmingly, numerous issues in recent years have made cooperation difficult. The Fisherman Problem, India's involvement in the Sri Lankan Civil War, and the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement are among the major factors that have strained relations between the two countries. On the other hand, India is always willing to assist and supply aid to Sri Lanka in times of crisis.

1.4 INDIA'S AND IT'S NEIGHBOUR-II

1.4.1 Bangladesh

India and Bangladesh are naturally connected by their common ancestry, shared history, and shared memories of tragic loss and the Partition of India in 1947. Historical connections have evolved into diverse and developing bilateral interactions. Both countries can boost their connections and economies due to their closeness.

As David M. Malone explained that Bangladesh is also often regarded as a shelter for extremists, terrorists, and Indian insurgents in the northeast. As a result, except for a short time immediately after Bangladesh's freedom in

1971, bilateral relations have been marked by distrust, discord, and suspicion (Malone, 2011, pp; 112-113).

Bangladesh's culture and ethnicity are similar to West Bengal's. This dialect of Bengali connects East India, Northeast India, and Bangladesh. Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971. After Bangladesh's formation, India and Bangladesh had friendly ties; however, challenges arose.

In 1972, India and Bangladesh signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, establishing modern relations. Two parties dominate Bangladesh now. Sheikh Hasina's Awami League is secular and pro-India. Begum Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) favours Bengali nationalism and dislikes India. Throughout the Cold War, neighbouring nations' relationships fluctuated. Since the Cold War ended, Indo-Bangladesh relations have been led by the BNP and the Awami League. The BNP prefers Pakistan and China, whereas the Awami League favours India. In 2021, Bangladesh and India will celebrate 50 years of diplomatic ties.

The emergence of Bangladesh was a significant aspect of India's "Neighbourhood First Strategy" and New Delhi's "Act East Policy" to establish connections with Southeast Asia. A friendly Bangladesh can prevent anti-Indian actions on its land. Bangladesh arrested numerous key leaders of northeast insurgent organizations, including the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. Bangladesh is a natural Act East pillar. It may serve as a "bridge" to Southeast Asia and beyond. Bangladesh contributes to BIMSTEC and BBIN. Bangladesh is strategically located near critical maritime routes. Therefore, it can reduce piracy and gain stability in the Indian Ocean.

1.4.4 Nepal, Bhutan

Bhutan and Nepal not only have shared borders, shared culture, and history with India but are also strategically critical for Indian diplomacy.

India acts toward Nepal based on the following factors: Nepal is a landlocked (buffer state) country between India and China, it influenced by the India-China actions. Historically, both countries have had a similar view of security; there are cultural similarities between the two countries; Nepal is not only where Gautam Buddha was born, but it is also known for Hindu kingdom in the world.

India and Nepal signed two treaties in 1950: the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Treaty of Trade and Commerce. These treaties set the rules for how the two countries could work together. The first plan was for safety considering that the Chinese could be a threat from across the border. It made sure that India and Nepal would work closely together on issues related to Nepal's security. Nepal is trying to keep from falling under the control of China. The talks became important since this treaty would be renewed every ten years. In 1971, there were changes in the treaty. Right of transit was used instead of "freedom of transit." This treaty was split into two separate agreements during the Janata government, one for trade and

one for transit. Relations between India and Nepal have long been organized by state interests.

However, Nepalese's believed that the treaties and agreements between India and Nepal are 'unequal' and not conducive to Nepal's interests. In the late 1980s, India gradually shifted to a more sympathetic approach towards Nepal. The Indian government praised the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement of November 2006, which aimed to bring political stability to Nepal by encouraging peaceful reconciliation and democratic processes. In order to ensure the peace process's success and the institutionalization of Nepal's multi-party democracy, India has consistently responded with a sense of urgency to the needs of the people and the government. A very recent development was the visit to Nepal by the recent Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2022. In addition to strengthening bilateral cultural and civilization relations, several Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) were signed during the visit between Indian and Nepali officials.

Until quite recently, India and Bhutan enjoyed a cordial but distant relationship. While they signed a treaty of friendship calling for peace and non-interference in each other's internal affairs on August 8, 1949, the relationship did not gain momentum until Jawaharlal Nehru visited Bhutan in 1958 and was enchanted by it. Regarding the dominance of its tiny Himalayan neighbour, David Malone argues that the relationship has been a genuine friendship, a positive and mutually respectful one. India is working hard to keep its profile in Bhutan as low as possible. Bhutanese mainly express appreciation for India's contributions.

For Bhutan's new king's official visit to India in August 2008, Delhi pulled out all the stops, wasting no opportunity to show his and his country its respect. The king's visit coincided with recent structural changes in the bilateral relationship: in 2007, India signed a new treaty of friendship, ending its guidance on Bhutan's foreign policy (though India's vital security interests are safeguarded).

Current Indian foreign policy has much more focus on neighbouring countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose Bhutan as India's first foreign destination, prioritizing regional cooperation over global cooperation. He laid the foundation stone for Bhutan's Supreme Court complex and promised more investments in its IT sector. The year 2018 was a milestone in the relationship between India and Bhutan. Both countries celebrated what they had done together over the past fifty years. The economic ties between India and Bhutan have been an essential part of their relationship. India is Bhutan's biggest market for exports, its most significant supplier of imports, and one of the country's most prominent investors from outside of Bhutan. India also lets Bhutan pass through its land to get to seaports to trade with the rest of the world. One of the most critical ways India and Bhutan work together to help each other is through hydropower projects. These projects give India, a significant contributor to global warming, a reliable source of cheap and clean electricity for Bhutan's GDP and promote economic integration between India and Bhutan.

1.4.5 Myanmar

Myanmar is strategically important to Delhi because of its proximity to China and India. In addition, Myanmar has a 1643-kilometre border with some of India's north-eastern states. Geography has helped build and maintain cordial connections and has allowed people-to-people communication. The Indian community in Myanmar dates back to 1852 when the British occupied Lower Burma.

In terms of our relationship with Myanmar, India has come a long way. India had assisted in the drafting of the Burmese Constitution. It was forgiven when hundreds of thousands of Indians were expelled from the country; their property was seized without compensation. Burma and its assets were seized without compensation during the 1962 India-China war.

On the other hand, Burma exerted significant control over anti-Indian insurgents operating on Burmese soil. During the 1962 India-China war, Burma remained neutral and gradually moved into China's orbit, whereas India adopted a benign neglect policy. After India harshly criticized Burma's military rulers for their bloody suppression of pro-democracy supporters in 1998, relations devolved into open hostility. This unexpected Indian reaction pushed an isolated Myanmar into China's arms, a nation with whom Myanmar has a complicated and unfriendly history (Chakraverty, 2014).

As per current India's neighbourhood policy, Myanmar is strategically significant for India's "Look Act Policy". Moreover, because it is the only country that connects South Asia and Southeast Asia by land, Myanmar is an essential part of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC). It aims to connect the port of Kolkata in eastern India to the deep-water port of Sittwe in Myanmar's Rakhine state. India built the Sittwe port in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Sea, river, and road transport corridors work together to make connections stronger.

1.5 BILATERAL ISSUES

David M. Malone stated, "No big country is loved by its neighbours." India's neighbourhood policy "abounds with ironies." However, throughout history, India has always been considered a "big brother" in South Asia. However, it is hard to accept that Indian diplomacy could not convince its neighbours that India is an opportunity for them, not a threat. However, Indian foreign policy advocated peaceful coexistence and mutual respect.

S.D. Muni suggests that India's approach to its neighbours has five problems:

1. A lack of a balanced political view
2. Differences in power
3. India's economic clout

4. power from outside the region
5. Attitudes, diplomatic styles, and personalities

He says that insisting too much on bilateralism or even encouraging it creates unnecessary fears and suspicions of Indian dominance and gives anti-Indian forces a chance to use it to their benefit. The best way to achieve bilateral goals is through a multilateral approach, especially since neighbours "feel more comfortable in a regional design that takes into account bilateral priorities and concerns." (S.D. Muni, 2003). India's foreign policy faces various severe issues with its neighbours, including:

1.5.2 Land and Maritime Boundary Issues

India and Bangladesh have had territorial disputes. These include the New Moore Island conflict, the Teen Bigha corridor issue, and the Muhuni Char clash in the Belonia sector. New Moore Island is still the biggest concern. The Bay of Bengal's New Moore Island measures 2 to 12 km², depending on the tide. The closest Indian and Bangladeshi coasts are separated by 5,000 meters. The island's issues began when the Indian flag flew on March 12, 1980. Bangladesh challenged India's ownership. The matter is still unresolved despite many discussions. The teen Bigha incident harmed Indo-Bangladesh relations. The then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi leased Teen Bigha to Bangladesh. This lease arrangement needed a constitutional change. India and Bangladesh signed and implemented the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) a historic deal on 31st July 2015 that would resolve a 41-year-old territorial border dispute through territory exchange, removing a major irritant in bilateral relations.

The Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the India-Myanmar border are both in flux. Artificial borders were established in South Asia for imperial purposes during and after British dominance. There has been no genuine attempt to create a state system that is well-suited to the realities of the South Asian Dilemma. Border disputes have become so common that they can no longer be avoided.

India and China's border is not always clearly defined. Along with parts of its 3,488-kilometer length, no mutually accepted lines of actual control (LAC) exist. Following independence, India believed it had inherited a set of secure borders from the British, but China disagreed. Instead, China believed the British had left a contested legacy along the border between the two newly constituted countries.

Twenty Indian soldiers were killed in recent border skirmishes with China in the Galwan Valley in June 2020. After the 1962 war, this was the most ferocious border conflict with China.

1.5.2 Water Sharing Issue

India and Bangladesh's major disagreement is over the Ganga River. This argument concerns water sharing during the lean season when Ganga's flow drops to 55,000 cusecs from January to May. If India withdraws 40,000

cusecs to flush the Hooghly to preserve Calcutta port, Bangladesh would only get 15,000 cusecs, which is inadequate to satisfy its demands. India's higher water withdrawals cause concerns in Bangladesh. Thus, India and Bangladesh disagree about sharing Ganga waters. India erected the Farakka Barrage on the Ganga in Farakka, 400 km north of Calcutta. This barrage was built to preserve and maintain Calcutta port and assist Bhagirathi-Hooghly navigability.

The barrage has protected Calcutta port but diverting water for the port has caused worldwide strife and misunderstanding. The ultimate deal to control Ganga water and address the Farakka barrage problem was reached in 1996. On 12th December 1996, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and India Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda struck a 30-year contract with India to share Ganga waters called "The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty 1996". The critical aspect of this treaty about Ganga water at Farraka is that it is divided into 15 to 10-day blocks from January 1 to May 3 every year.

Kalapani water is India's most prominent water issue. The Kalapani dispute began in 1816 when the Treaty of Sagauli ended the Gurkha War/Anglo-Nepal War (1814-16). Kalapani comes from the nearby river Kali. The Kali River divided Nepal from British India. According to Article 5 of the Treaty, the King of Nepal gave up territorial claims over the western region of the river Kali, which originates in the High Himalayas and flows into the great plains of the Indian Subcontinent. However, the British acknowledged Nepal's suzerainty over east-river areas. Nepal reports that the Kalapani starts in the highlands east of the Kali River near Limpiyadhura. Nepal claims a mountainous area east of Limpiyadhura.

India maintains the Starting boundary from where the river originates at Kalapani. Diverging conceptions of the Kali River's origins generate the dispute. For example, Nepal claims land east of Kali based on Limpiyadhura, although India argues the river gets its name at Kalapani.

1.5.3 Cross Border Terrorism, Migration and Terrorism

In South Asia, terrorism is partially sponsored, partly homegrown, and partly driven by decades of isolation caused by historical and economic factors. There is little question that terror attacks in the United States are more widespread and violent than in Southeast Asia. This is primarily due to the region's excellent proximity to West Asia and the existence of al-Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also a result of the protracted warfare in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The hard-line Taliban rule offered refuge to al-Qaeda agents operating in these war zones. In order to attain their ultimate aim, residual al-Qaeda troops have joined forces with other extremist organizations in South Asia, such as the Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, building up an ummah.

Cross-border terrorism is a major issue in India and other South Asian countries; some incidents have occurred in India, but most cases involve cross-border terrorism, such as the 26/11 attack in Mumbai (2008).

Pakistan, according to C. Rajamohan, is a formidable foe for India, partly because it believes that terrorism will "weaken India from within." The consolidation of democratic, pluralist and secular structures, an outstanding effort to highlight the global consequences of Indian society, the military's use of terrorism as a tool of state policy, and Pakistan's establishment, followed by steps to increase its expenses; are all part of dealing with Pakistan-funded terrorism. Terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001; a suicide vehicle bomber attacked the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008; and a terrorist attack in Mumbai killed over 200 people in November 2008. However, despite the difficulty of establishing solid links with the Islamabad administration, India has developed a pattern of significant moderation in its response to these incidents (Malone, 2011), pp. 108).

The presence of Chakma refugees in India's Tripura complicates India-Bangladesh relations. In 1994, Tripura Chakma refugees were repatriated to Bangladesh. Most have been returned, but some remain. Most Bangladeshi migrants are from weaker sections and have migrated to India. Their projected 10 lakh population harms India's economy. Despite India's repeated demands, Bangladesh refuses to recall them; therefore, India would deport them.

1.6 SUMMARY

India's foreign policy focuses on building a safe, stable, peaceful, cooperative neighbourhood. India's foreign policy has gradually evolved from 1947 to 2022 according to national interests, regional demands, and global requirements. From idealism to pragmatism, India's diplomacy shifted toward its neighbours. The landmark transformation after the I. K. Gujral Doctrine, the first neighbourhood policy, focused more on the South Asian region.

India has prioritized cordial ties with its neighbours. India's connections with Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Myanmar, China, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh show its determination to avoid confrontations, handle international problems peacefully, and create friendships with all its neighbours. Non-aligned neighbours have broadly welcomed India's peace policy. India, on the other hand, has been through wars and conflicts. Despite India's best efforts to foster friendly relations with Pakistan by taking unilateral decisions without expecting a reciprocal favour (Prime Minister I.K. Gujral's "Gujral Doctrine"), such as Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's Lahore Bus Service, Agra Summit, etc for normalizing the Bilateral relations.

We cannot change the historical conflict led by colonial powers in the South Asian region for their own interest. Several dialogues between the neighbouring countries can resolve the historical conflict in a peaceful manner. Despite the border issue, water sharing issue, terrorism, and migration which have been a hurdle to the healthy relation of India with its neighbours. However, India promotes peace in the region through Bilateral Dialogues, People to people connectivity and regional cooperation.

India's current foreign policy proactively engages with neighbours, showing India's biggest concern is neighbours rather than others. However, tensions remain between India- Pakistan, and China. India actively participates in regional organizations like SAARC and BIMSTEC, which help reduce tensions and increase peace and prosperity between neighbours.

1.6 QUESTION

1. Discuss about India's Neighbourhood first Policy
2. Write the Note on India – China Relations
3. Write a note on India's Relations with neighbouring countries in post-cold war era.
4. Discuss about India's dispute with Myanmar
5. Describe the issues India face with its neighbouring countries

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INDIA AND IT'S NEIGHBOUR- I

Unit Structure :

- 2.0 Objectives
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 India- China Relations
- 2.3 India- Pakistan Relations
- 2.4 India - Afghanistan Relations
- 2.5 India- Sri Lanka Relations
- 2.6 Summary/Conclusion
- 2.7 References

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you all will be familiarized with India's neighbourhood policy. India has been promoting international peace and cooperation and developing bilateral relations with all countries, especially the neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and China are India's immediate neighbours with whom it has friendly relations based on bonds of common culture and heritage. In this lesson we will study about India's relations with China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. After studying this lesson, you would be able to-

- identify the major sources of friction in Sino-Indian bilateral relations;
- identify the various initiatives for resolving the border dispute with China;
- analyze Indo-Pak bilateral relations in the historical perspective of Kashmir problem;
- identify the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan;
- trace historical, cultural and ethnic ties between India and Sri Lanka; and
- explain the growth of Tamil Separatist Movement and its impact on Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

2.1 INTRODUCTION:

India as a geographical entity has a unique character. It shares its boundaries with nations greatly varying in their size, resources and strength. These nations include Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. India has struggled to maintain stable and strong relations with its neighbours in a region considered to be the least integrated in the world. Atal Bihari Vajpayeeji had once famously said 'You can change your friends but not neighbours' (Vajpayee 2003). For India to play

a vital role in the emerging multi-polar world politics, it is important to develop enduring linkages between its domestic priorities and its foreign policy objectives. Political and socio-economic development of India is largely dependent on a stable, secure and peaceful neighbourhood. C. Raja Mohan argues that without enduring primacy in one's own neighbourhood, no nation can become a credible power on the global stage (C. R. Mohan, *India's Neighbourhood Policy: Four Dimensions* 2007). Rajamohan and S. D. Muni argue that for India 'achieving the objective of becoming one of the principal powers of Asia will depend entirely on India's ability to manage its own neighbourhood' (S. M. Mohan 2004). The 'Kathmandu Declaration' adopted on November 27th, 2014 at the culmination of the 18th SAARC summit held in Kathmandu, Nepal proclaimed speeding up the process of regional development and cooperation as its aim. It recognized that after three decades of the organization's existence, it was time to 'reinvigorate' SAARC and 'revitalize' the bloc as an effective vehicle to fulfill the developmental aspirations of the people. This declaration was an outcome of the increasing urge felt by the South Asian countries to unite and develop together as a region. The Heads of State present at the summit expressed their strong determination to deepen regional integration for peace, stability and prosperity in South Asia by enhancing cooperation in trade, energy, security, infrastructure, connectivity and culture; and implementing projects in a prioritized, result-oriented and time-bound manner.

Post-independence, through the 1950s and 1960s India's foreign policy was driven by idealism, the chief architect being Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India. He focused on meeting the domestic challenge India's Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges and Prospects 21 of consolidating independence and economic revitalization of the nation. Nehru chose the path of non-alignment in the face of a bipolar world order shaped by the politics of the Cold War, arguing that India would have to 'plough a lonely furrow' (Appadorai 1982). India's defeat in the 1962 Indo-Chinese border war exposed her to the hard realities of international power politics. The subsequent Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 severely challenged India's prevailing foreign policy stance and led to a shift towards adoption policies, which held security as the prime Indian national interest. Muni describes diplomatic styles and personalities as one of the areas that define India's approach towards the neighborhood. Indira Gandhi after coming to power in 1966 asserted that the problems of developing countries needed to be faced 'not merely by idealism, not merely by sentimentalism, but by very clear thinking and hard-headed analysis of the situation' (Appadorai 1982).

For the next few years, establishing sub-continental hegemony in order to secure its own interests became the overriding goal of Indian foreign policy. Though India defended its role in the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 on the ground of its national security being threatened by the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan and after requests to the U.N. to act against Pakistan failed to yield results. However, despite all justifications, the role played by India in the emergence of Bangladesh is viewed even today as evidence of regional apprehensions. The crisis contributed to inciting fear in the region that India through its power has the ability to alter the geo-political

landscape of South Asia. This regional fear psychosis was reinforced with India's militarily involvement in Sri Lanka in 1987. In November 1988 the involvement of the Indian military in Maldives to foil an attempted coup on the island reinforced the overbearing presence of India in the region.

In the initial years, India chose to deal with its neighbourhood by engaging in bilateral talks and treaties and not in a regional framework. This decision of India gave rise to a feeling among the neighbouring countries that India uses bilateralism as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. It is important to implement a regional design that incorporates bilateral priorities and concerns and creates a balance in the power differentials. But the only regional arrangement that existed in South Asia was the SAARC that has struggled to remain relevant. Following deliberations and negotiations for about five years, the establishment of SAARC was agreed to in 1985 only after two operational constraints were built into it, namely, to take decisions on the basis of unanimity; and to avoid bilateral and contentious issues from its deliberations. Strained bilateral relations and political differences between SAARC members, especially the persistent conflict and tension between India and Pakistan have been responsible for the failure of this regional design to make any substantial contribution to the growth of the region. In the 30 years of its existence, SAARC has missed 12 of its annual summits largely because of bilateral issues between its members. It accounts for only 2 percent of the region's global trade and not more than 10 percent of regional trade. Nearly six hundred million South Asian people continue to live below the poverty line (of US \$1.25 a day) despite two commissions set up by SAARC to devise means for poverty alleviation in the region (S. D. Muni 2015).

The upcoming units will be dealing with India and Its neighbours, i.e. China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.

2.2 INDIA - CHINA RELATIONS

India and China are the two great giants of Asia. Besides being the most populous countries, they are also two of the most ancient civilisations of the world. Historically, several historians have successfully traced the cultural linkages dating back to 2nd century BC. As a result of the communist revolution in 1949, China became the People's Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of Mao Tse Tung. Nehru regarded India as China's rival for the leadership of the non-white people of the world. India, on the other hand, tried its best to come close to China. It was the first non-communist country to recognize communist China in 1949. India fully supported China's claim for membership in the United Nations. It also acknowledged China's claim over Formosa (Taiwan). It refused to be a party to the peace treaty with Japan without China. In the Korean crisis too, India refused to brand China as aggressor when China intervened on behalf of North Korea. In fact, India supported China even though the Western bloc, especially the USA, was displeased with it.

Nehru's China policy received the first jolt in 1950, when China occupied Tibet in 1950. It is important to remember in this context that India had long

term interests in Tibet because it was a buffer lying between India and China. India even enjoyed certain special privileges in Tibet. Therefore, direct Chinese control over Tibet was likely to endanger these, and India's security. India's suggestions for a peaceful settlement of the Tibet problem were treated as interference by the communist regime. Gradually the Tibetans grew restless under China's yoke and rose in revolt in 1959. China ruthlessly suppressed the movement and declared Tibet as an integral part of China. The head of Tibet, Dalai Lama took shelter in India while Tibet lost whatever autonomy it still enjoyed. The granting of political shelter to Dalai Lama by India added to China's distrust. China appreciated India's neutral and mediatory role in easing the Korean problem (1950- 53). Thus, began a period of friendship between the two countries, with the signing of the Sino-Indian Treaty of friendship in 1954. This treaty put a seal of approval upon Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The Preamble of the treaty embodies the famous 'Panchsheel Principles' about which you have studied (lesson number 26). This agreement initiated a period of relaxed relationship, marked by the slogan of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai. It is interesting to note that at the Bandung Conference (1955), Pt Nehru actively brought China into the hold of the Afro-Asian solidarity.

Boundary Dispute between India and China

The 1950s were marked by the boundary dispute between India and China, the flash point of which unfortunately caused a war between the two countries in 1962. China first started to claim large parts of Indian territory in North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh) and Ladakh by publishing maps in which these were shown as included in China. China continued extending its borders and also constructed a 110-mile-long road across Aksai China area (Ladakh) of India in 1956-57. In 1959, China put claim to some 50,000 sq. miles of Indian territory and also denied the validity of McMahon Line.

By this time Tibet had been fully integrated into China; it was in a strong position at the India-China border with Chinese troops posted all along. While the two countries were in dispute over the McMahon line issue, China launched a massive attack on India in October 1962, in the NEFA as well as the Ladakh sector. After overrunning large areas of Indian territory, China announced a unilateral ceasefire after occupying huge territory of India 200 sq. miles in the North Eastern sector and 15,000 sq. miles in Ladakh.

A futile attempt to work out a peaceful settlement between the two countries was made by Sri Lanka. The Colombo Proposals failed because China refused to agree on conditions contained in them. For a long time in the years following the war, China-India relations did not show any improvement. In fact, China went out of the way to make friends with Pakistan, in order to isolate and contain India.

Normalization of Relations

Although the two countries resumed diplomatic relations in 1976 by exchanging ambassadors. The efforts of normalization of Sino-Indian

relations received a boost when the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid a successful five day visit to China in 1988. The two countries pledged to settle the border dispute through dialogue. Several high-level visits followed including visit by Ex-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003. The two countries agreed to keep the border dispute apart, and develop friendly relations in other fields. Until the border dispute is resolved, both countries agreed to maintain peace and tranquility on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

One could see a clear shift in the Chinese attitude towards India. The fact that erstwhile USSR had mended fences with China, there were no more apprehensions from the South. Moreover, China's post-1979 economic transformation demanded big markets for its massive production under economic liberalisation. President Jiang Zemin's visit to India in 1996 witnessed a major consolidation of this progress. This was the first ever visit of China's head of State to India. China's withdrawal of support to Naga and Mizo rebels; meaningful silence on the status of Sikkim (China considered Sikkim's status as that of an independent state) and a neutral stand on Kashmir issue could be seen as a positive shift in Chinese attitude towards India.

Nevertheless, there was suddenly a brief setback in the mutual ties of the two after the nuclear explosions by India during 1998. These were followed by sharp Chinese reaction and its leading role in getting the resolutions condemning the tests in UN and similar fora, passed. These tests by India were seen as neutralizing Chinese prominence in the region. But the Chinese posture of neutrality during the Indo-Pak military showdown in Kashmir, Kargil sector in 1999 exhibited China's inclination to a softer and friendly line with India. In fact, Chinese refusal to interfere in the conflict forced Pakistan for cessation of hostilities with India.

However, Ex-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's 2003 visit to China is a renewed effort in the promotion of close and cordial ties between the two neighbours. The border agreement has recognised the Nathula Pass in Sikkim as a border pass, implying that China no longer considers Sikkim as an independent state. Another positive breakthrough was the Joint Declaration that underlined the need to explore a framework of a boundary settlement at the political level of bilateral relations. This is an acknowledgement that the key issue in resolving the dispute is political. This is seen as Beijing's readiness to give up its policy of delaying dialogue. India's National Security Advisor and Chinese Vice Minister had been appointed for holding the tasks. The developments at the diplomatic and political levels were supplemented by fresh initiatives at the economic level to strengthen bilateral relations. The border trade between India and China has crossed \$ 10 billion quickly.

The INC-led (Indian National Congress) UPA formed a coalition government in May 2004 and released the Common Minimum Program (CMP) that would serve as template for governance for the period 2004- 09. In its section on foreign policy the CMP stated, "[T]he UPA government will give the highest priority to building closer political, economic and other

ties with its neighbors in South Asia...Trade and investment with China will be expanded further and talks on the border issue pursued seriously." This phase has also witnessed a maturing of Indian foreign policy with "economic diplomacy" and "active multilateralism" becoming the preferred policy outcome from New Delhi in its interactions with neighboring countries and beyond. Prima facie it could be argued that first, since the turn of the century Indian foreign policy has exhibited a strong positive value in economic diplomacy and second, closer engagement with China is evidence of the success of India's "Look East" policy adopted in 1992.

A decade after Jiang Zemin's visit in 1996, the Chinese president, Hu Jintao became the second president from China to visit India from November 20 - 23, 2006. The highlight of the visit was the Joint Statement issued that commits both countries to a "ten-pronged strategy" to further improve bilateral relations.¹ Maintaining the high-level political connectivity between the two countries, the Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, visited China from January 13-15, 2008. Dr. Manmohan Singh's visit to China was significant for several reasons²⁵ - first., it reflected the determination of both countries to deepen relations despite the existence of "differences" over the boundary dispute; second, the visit highlighted the growing recognition of trade as an entirely new dimension of cooperation between the two countries and third, the visit brought out the importance for both countries to enunciate their common perspectives on a range of issues as reflected in the "Vision Statement" released by Dr. Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao during the visit.

The "Vision Statement" marked a departure from earlier bilateral joint statements and aimed to project a shared commitment and approach by both sides to issues of global import. The similarities of India and China's developmental experience are too many to be missed. For India, the reform process since 1991 ushered in major changes across the socio-political spectrum. The days of one-party majority in the Indian parliament are a thing of the past, with coalition alliances the mainstay. Regional political parties have grown in stature and electoral alliances are forged on the basis of societal permutations and combinations that were unthinkable a decade ago." In China, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds a monopoly on power, the groundswell of change is felt from loose associations of those marginalized from the reform process as they are increasingly making themselves heard. The CCP has also changed—a technocratic — legalist elite as represented by President Hu Jintao and Vice-President Xi Jinping prevails in Beijing. This is in stark contrast to the revolutionary leadership as exemplified by Mao when the CCP considered itself to be at the vanguard of a global socialist revolution.

During the State Visit of Chinese President Mr. Xi Jinping to India from 17 to 19 September 2014, a total of 16 agreements were signed in various sectors including, commerce & trade, railways, space -cooperation, pharmaceuticals, audio-visual co production, culture, establishment of industrial parks, sister-city agreements etc. The two sides also signed a MoU to open an additional route for Kailash Mansarovar Yatra through NathuLa. The Chinese side agreed to establish two Chinese Industrial Parks in India

and expressed their intention to enhance Chinese investment in India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China from May 14-16, 2015. Besides meeting with the Chinese leadership, Prime Minister Modi and Premier Li also addressed the opening session of the First State/Provincial Leaders' Forum in Beijing. There were 24 agreements signed on the government-to-government side, 26 MoUs on the business-to-business side and two joint statements, including one on climate change. Prime Minister also announced the extension of the e-visa facility to Chinese nationals wishing to travel to India.

The momentum of meetings at the leadership level continued in 2016 too. President Pranab Mukherjee made a state visit to China from May 24 to 27, 2016. He visited Guangdong and Beijing where he met with the Chinese leadership. President also delivered a keynote address at the Peking University and attended a Round Table between Vice Chancellors and Heads of institutions of higher learning of the two countries. Ten MoUs providing for enhanced faculty and student exchanges as well as collaboration in research and innovation were concluded between the higher education institutions of the two countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China in September 2016 to participate in the G20 Summit in Hangzhou and September 2017 to participate in the BRICS Summit in Xiamen, where he also held bilateral talks with President Xi Jinping. President Xi Jinping visited India in October 2016 to participate in the BRICS Summit in Goa. The two leaders also met along the sidelines of the SCO Heads of States Summit in Tashkent in June 2016 and in Astana in June 2017. But there have been various roadblocks in Indo-China relations, eg. The China-India border standoff, which began in spring of 2020, continues to date at various friction points in Eastern Ladakh, notwithstanding the important breakthroughs in February and August 2021, when troops from both sides mutually withdrew from the north and south banks of the Pangong Tso and, possibly, also at the Gogra Post. On June 15, 2020, a deadly skirmish broke out between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley, causing casualties on both sides for the first time in nearly 45 years, marking a new unpleasant turn in China-India relations. The gruesome clash caused public outrage in India, and anti-China sentiment reached its peak. Meanwhile, in China, a sense of shock over the rapid deterioration in China-India ties was palpable.

The sheer magnitude of the Galwan incident, the high number of casualties, an unprecedented level of perceived escalation by India, and the global attention around the development caused much unease within Chinese strategic circles. In one of the first major interviews after the incident, renowned Chinese scholar Zheng Yongnian, Founding Director of the Advanced Institute of Global and Contemporary China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in Shenzhen and a well-known Chinese government advisor, lamented how Beijing lacks understanding of a rising India and its importance to China. He lamented the lack of recognition in China that the Beijing-New Delhi relationship would get as the most important relationship after the Beijing-Washington relationship. He was also critical of Beijing's India policy still being managed at a comparatively lower level in terms of policy/military planning, thereby exhibiting a

Check Your Progress Exercise 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

1) Critically analyze India- China relations with relevant examples.

2.3 INDIA- PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Certain important historical and geographic compulsions that surfaced at the time of the partition of India in 1947 have had significant bearing on the thinking of both the countries. Islam was considered as a rallying point for national unity of a people who claimed to hold a different national identity. It became a separatist force that was not in line with the national mainstream of anti-colonial struggle. This has been accepted as a root of the creation of Pakistan. There are three important issues these countries face in their bilateral relations: (i) the difference in worldviews, (ii) the dispute over Kashmir and (iii) the problem of nuclear confrontation.

(i) The difference in worldviews:

India and Pakistan, as two core countries of South Asia had different worldviews that determined 4 their foreign policies. During the early years after independence, the Indian worldview had been dominated by concerns about building a regional identity of the post-colonial nations of Asia. One of the important aspects of this policy was opposition to the extra regional intervention in South Asia. India sought to keep the South Asian issues within the ambit of South Asian countries. Opposition to the entry of Cold War alliances in Asia and eventual path of non-alignment is part of this worldview. The period from 1947 to 1971 saw two trends in India's approach towards South Asia. One was the trend that was initiated by Nehru. It focused on regionalism as the dominant theme. The second emerged during the Lal Bahadur Shastri years. This came in the aftermath of the 1962 war and the need for resetting the Indian worldview keeping in mind its capabilities. Shastri was to stress on bilateralism as the key to foreign policy, especially in relation to South Asian countries. It is in the post-1971 period that India developed a coherent South Asia policy that was to determine India's approach towards its South Asian neighbours. The base of this policy lay in India's power status in South Asia. The architecture of the policy rested on a combination of two approaches: regionalism that was now restricted to South Asia and the consequent perception of South Asia as a regional state system; and bilateralism, which was the basis of the Simla

Agreement of 1972. Pakistan's perception of its role emerged from the realisation of two simultaneous forces—the geopolitics of the country that was divided between East and West Pakistan and the Islamic worldview. The former placed Pakistan firmly in the South Asian regional state system while the latter brought it close to the Islamic world of West Asia. Pakistan thus saw itself as a nation with two distinct identities and roles, that of a South Asian power and that of an Islamic West Asian power that was to eventually emerge as an important country of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. One of the dominant security concerns that Pakistan sought to address right from its inception is that of fear of India. The problem of Pakistan's foreign and defence policy revolved around this central theme of Indian domination and safeguards that were to be instituted to counter this threat. Pakistan's attempts to establish linkages with the Islamic world, with China and participate in the military alliances of the United States can be understood within this security concern of Pakistan. These links provided an opportunity for Pakistan to counteract India's desire to dominate in what India considered its sphere of influence.

(ii) Manifestation of Conflict: Kashmir

This fundamental diversity in the views of India and Pakistan manifests on the issue of Kashmir, an issue that has come to be identified by Pakistan as the core of the bilateral divide. Kashmir, like Junagadh and Hyderabad, opted to decide its future as to whether to join India or to merge with Pakistan. In case of Hyderabad and Junagadh, the Indian government took steps to ensure that the wishes of the overwhelming local Hindu populace were respected and hastened the process of merger of these two states in the Indian Union. Kashmir had a peculiar problem. It had distinct distribution patterns of its population, with the Ladakh area being predominantly Buddhist, the Jammu region Hindu and the Kashmir valley Muslim. Pakistan sought to force the pace of the decision making on Kashmir by permitting the 'irregular army' to enter Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh, realising the potential problems, signed the Instrument of Accession with India, thus merging the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union.

The first Indo-Pakistan war that followed the merger of Kashmir into India left the state partitioned. India took the matter to the United Nations and agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiris. According to the cease-fire resolution adopted by the UN Security Council, the plebiscite was conditional upon the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kashmir and the restoration of the situation to the pre-1947 position. This condition was never met by Pakistan and the plebiscite also never came to be conducted.

Kashmir has seen a tumultuous history since the first war of 1948. The new government formed by Sheikh Abdullah, a Kashmiri leader of long standing, came to be dismissed in 1953. Sheikh Abdullah was relieved of his post as his party the National Conference refused to accept the accession to India as final and vaguely talked of the final settlement of the state of Kashmir in the future. Sheikh Abdullah was brought back to head the government in Kashmir in 1975 after he and Indira Gandhi signed an

agreement. Now Sheikh Abdullah had given up the earlier separatist demand and had accepted Kashmir to be legitimately a part of India. In 1965, India and Pakistan fought a war over Kashmir. This war, as the Pakistani Air Marshal Asghar Khan put it, was a war to solve the problem once and for all. The Tashkent Conference (1966) also failed to provide any results. Though, the 1971 war was more a war about the future of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, it had a definite aspect of Kashmir about it.

The Simla Agreement sought to create a new framework of interaction for India and Pakistan and freeze the issue of Kashmir along the Line of Control indefinitely. One understands from the writings of Indian leaders involved in the making of this agreement that there was an implicit understanding of converting the LOC into a boundary in the eventual future. It is in this context that the return of Sheikh Abdullah became significant. Now India had a Kashmiri leader, heading a Kashmiri party, The National Conference, taking the position that Kashmir is part of India. This was tantamount to a plebiscite. This was the test of the right to self-determination that the Kashmiris had been promised by the plebiscite. India could now talk of political legitimacy for the accession of Kashmir to India.

Several developments appear to complicate the problem in Kashmir in the 1980s. Global Islamic resurgence came to be a force to reckon with. The growth of fundamentalist Islamic groups and the spread in their activity had become a matter of concern even for the United States. Pakistan was in a unique position in those days. Given its relatively liberal Islamic posture and the possibility of emergent democratic governments in Pakistan led it to retain a relatively close relationship with the United States. On the other hand, it had excellent relations with the core Islamic world. It had excellent access to the new Afghan government of Taliban and also to other radical Islamic organizations. Pakistan thus appears to have benefited from the then international situation. The post-1975 developments on Kashmir constitute the beginning of an entirely new chapter in its history. Adverse reactions to Sheikh Abdullah's rule started in the late 1970s. Partly it was a product of the growing divide between the ruling class in Kashmir and the common populace that remained deprived of the fruits of development that the state sought to create. Partly, it was the product of resultant frustration that came to be created in the minds of the Kashmiri about the utility of Indian rule. One of the significant popular level movements came in the form of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). As an organisation that had strong Pakistani connections, the JKLF demanded the right to self-determination for the Kashmiris to join Pakistan. The 1980s saw two significant developments that had their impact on the developments in Kashmir. One was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that led to the massive arms supply by the United States to the Afghan rebels (Mujahideen) situated in Pakistan. Second was the change in Pakistani strategy regarding Kashmir. The American arms supply to the Afghans had a spillover effect in Kashmir. This was linked to the change in Pakistani tactics in terms of shifting from direct conflict to insurgency. Infiltration and insurgency have been a long pattern in Pakistani strategy on Kashmir. Prior to the 1965 war Pakistan had used this approach with little success.

The failure to solve the problem through the use of force in 1965 and 1971 had led to a change in strategy. Now infiltration took the shape of low intensity conflict. Efforts to paralyse the local law and order situation and create uncertainty in the region came to be the tactics of the day. The large-scale exit of the Kashmiri pundits from the valley was part of this protracted strategy. This Pakistani strategy was buttressed with a new clarion call of human rights violation. In the early 1990s, concern about violation of human rights had suddenly acquired newly found acceptance. In Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, the world appeared to have suddenly become sensitive to human rights. In Kashmir too, the old paradigm of self-determination was fast replaced by the new paradigm of human rights violation. Suddenly the situation in Kashmir came to be analyzed almost entirely along the human dimension. Demands came to be made by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), followed by the European powers for an on-the spot survey of violation of human rights by the Indian forces. The Indian government was persuaded enough to create a National Human Rights Commission of its own to monitor the problem. It took several years for the international community to acknowledge that terrorist outfits also violate human rights and that the responsibility of violation cannot be that of the Government alone.

In 1999 India and Pakistan came into conflict over an intrusion by Pakistan into Kargil. Was the crossing of the LOC by the Mujahideens, and the Pakistani troops a logical culmination of the ongoing approach taken on Kashmir? Did it represent an assessment by Pakistan that time was ripe to exert direct force by crossing the LOC and force India to resolve the Kashmir problem? Several explanations may be given for this Pakistani adventurism. One, that Pakistan must have assessed the time as being ripe for such an action to achieve its goal about accession of Kashmir. The political uncertainty in India and the obvious lack of consensus across the political spectrum in India would have also been one of the considerations. Two, this assessment must have been a military and intelligence assessment based on the active participation of the militant outfits. It was quite likely that the civil government was pulled into this decision after it was in place. If this be true it confirms the pattern of Pakistani politics that is dominated by competing interests of the army, the civilian representative elite, the intelligence units and the Islamic groups. The Pakistani premier's constant disclaims about the involvement of the Government in the Kargil action may not be entirely true. Such actions cannot take place without the knowledge and participation of the government (and that includes the army). But his statement may also indicate the truth that he has very little control over the Pakistan army and militant groups in Kargil. History shows that the creators of such groups eventually cease to control them as they tend to have a momentum of their own. Having committed itself in Kargil, Pakistan appeared to have taken on more than it could digest. The international public opinion has shifted away from Pakistan. Its old and trusted ally China took a neutral position and advised restraint and dialogue. The Pakistani premier was not able to move the United States either. The US visit of premier Sharif proved counterproductive. The Americans asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops to the LOC and begin a dialogue with India.

(iii) Nuclear Equation

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had generated a great deal of debate on the rationale and implications of these actions taken by both the governments. Much of the debate focused on the security considerations of this action, the regional threat dimensions and internal political compulsions. The Indian articulation focused on the threats from Pakistan and China, while Pakistan targeted India. The central questions raised about the Indian tests had been in the 'why' and 'why now' category. The debates used two distinct paradigms for analysis, the first using the security rationale and the second, the developmental rationale. The debates based on the first focused on the perceived threats from the regional order as manifested by Pakistan and China. The positions about the exact nature of threats and the methods of tackling these threats would vary from party to party at a political level. In case of the Pakistani tests, the answers would be more specific, in that they would point to India as the central culprit. Further, in both cases there would be very strong internal political compulsions. Now that the tests have confirmed the nuclear weapon capability (or actual weapon status) it may be safe to presume that the nations have achieved whatever minimal nuclear ambitions they had cherished.

The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 represented a demonstration of capabilities—technological and political. Technological capabilities were in the context of the denial of access to advanced technologies that India experienced over the years. The political capability represented the demonstration of political will of the elite to take on the G-7 regime. It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in face of anticipated sanctions that makes the nuclear test a symbol of a resurgent Third World. It is at that level that both, the Indian and Pakistani tests, demonstrate a commonality of approaches.

The Draft outline of Indian Nuclear Doctrine released on 17 August 1999 argued for autonomy in decision making about security for India. It takes the long established Indian line that security is an integral part of India's developmental process. It expresses concerns about the possible disruption of peace and stability and the consequent need to create a deterrence capability to ensure the pursuit of development. It argued that in the absence of a global nuclear disarmament policy, India's strategic interests required an effective credible deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. It continues to hold on the 'no first use doctrine' and the civilian control of nuclear decision-making.

The utility of nuclear deterrence (at whatever level) between India and Pakistan may be still unclear. But the Kargil conflict presented a threshold (a 'glass ceiling', to borrow from feminist terminology) beyond which the two powers may not be able to escalate their conflict. This threshold, in the form of the Line of Control was adhered to by India and was also imposed by the United States and China on Pakistan. In the short run, one may have

to make a distinction between conventional security considerations which include border conflicts and internal security problems on the one hand, and nuclear strategies on the other.

Therefore, there is the need to reinitiate the nuclear dialogue of 1985 that sought to create an agreement on not attacking each others' nuclear installations. This can now be supplemented by a declaration on 'no-first-use' policy. Both India and Pakistan would have to stress on the need to develop their peaceful-uses programme for its economic and industrial growth. This may require the two countries to bargain with the developed world for the transfer of advanced technology. The threat of sanctions on dual use technologies and the limited room for negotiations make it necessary for India and Pakistan to pool their resources for bargaining with the developed countries.

. Prime Minister Vajpayee's Bus Diplomacy in 1999 marked a tremendous goodwill between the two countries. The Lahore Declaration signed at the time underlined the need for resolving all outstanding issues, including that of Kashmir, through peaceful means. While India agreed to bring Kashmir onto the agreed agenda along with other areas of mutual benefits, Pakistan conceded to bilateralism. The reference to the 'composite and integrated' dialogue process implied that the two would not be a hostage to any single issue. Despite the rupture caused by the Kargil war and the terrorist attack against our Parliament (December 2001) the unconditional dialogue has been resumed. The emphasis in these talks is to promote people to people contacts across LoC, and also improve economic ties between India and Pakistan. Change of government in India has not meant any deviation from our commitment to peaceful and prosperous co-existence with Pakistan.

(iv) Dialogue between India- Pakistan

One must make a specific reference to the various attempts to establish a dialogue between the two countries and discuss their success and failures. India and Pakistan have signed two important treaties after they had fought border wars. The Tashkent Agreement (1966) saw a meeting of Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani president Ayub Khan. The agreement succeeded in freezing the Kashmir dispute but did not resolve the problems. The Simla Agreement (1972) saw an interaction between prime minister Indira Gandhi and foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who eventually went on to become the prime minister of Pakistan. There have been other occasions when the leaders of these two countries have had an opportunity to exchange views. One of these has been on the occasion of SAARC or Non-aligned Movement summit meetings. Such meetings were usually carried on the sidelines of the summits. Perhaps the more well-known recent meetings have been those between prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan premier Nawaz Shariff at Lahore (1999) and Vajpayee's meeting with General Pervez Musharraf at Agra (2001). The former saw the inauguration of the DelhiLahore Bus service and the signing of Lahore Declaration which reiterated the principle of bilateral approach to Indo-Pak problems, while the latter ended without any significant gains. In 2003 prime minister Vajpayee once again called for a comprehensive

dialogue with Pakistan. This initiative saw some forward movement with the exchange of parliamentary delegations and some informal talks that began between the two countries. Both, India and Pakistan share some common post colonial legacies. Both have attempted to address the problems of pluralistic societies and overcome the resistance of feudal tendencies in their efforts at political and economic modernisation. Both have strained their political institutions to accommodate socio-political upheavals. One may argue that the Indian experiment appears to have survived the test of time and that its political institutions have been able to cope with the demands placed on them. On the other hand Pakistan still continues to experiment with its institutions in search of stability.

Check Your Progress Exercise 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

1) Write a detailed essay on India- Pakistan relations.

2.4 INDIA- AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

India has historic and strong bilateral ties with its neighbour, Afghanistan, and both are a part of several regional level partnerships, like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). According to the MEA, the friendly relations can be traced back to January 1950 when a five-year Treaty of Friendship was signed by then Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru and Afghan's then Ambassador to India Mohammad Najibullah.

History of India-Afghanistan Relations

The contact between the people of modern-day India and Afghanistan has existed since the days of the Indus Valley Civilization. One of Alexander the Great's Diadochi (Greek for successors), Seleucus Nicator, controlled most of Afghanistan before ceding much of it to the Mauryan Empire in 305 BC as part of an alliance treaty. A number of invaders invaded the northern regions of India between the 10th century to the mid 18th century by a number of invaders such as Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Khaljis, Suris, Mughals, and Durrani on what today is known as Afghanistan.

During these eras, particularly during the Mughal period (1526–1858), many Afghans started to enter India due to political instability in their regions. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was one of the prominent leaders of the Indian independence movement and active supporters of the Indian

National Congress. Even though the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) became the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, unanimous Pashtun support for the Indian freedom struggle led to great sympathy in India for the cause of Pashtun autonomy and freedom. The Indian government continued to support Pashtun leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in lobbying for greater Pashtun freedom in the NWFP.

India was the only South Asian country to recognize the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the 1980s, though relations were diminished during the 1990s Afghan civil war and the Taliban government. India aided the overthrow of the Taliban and became the largest regional provider of humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Indians are working in various construction projects, as part of India's rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan.

Indo-Afghan Political Relations - During Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, India provided intelligence and logistic support for the Allied forces. After the fall of the Taliban, India established diplomatic relations with the newly established civilian government and participated in relief and reconstruction efforts.

Since 2001, India's development partnership with Afghanistan has gained importance because India is today the fifth-largest provider of development assistance to Afghanistan with its total commitment. India has provided about \$650–750 million worth of humanitarian and economic aid, making it the largest regional provider of aid for Afghanistan. India's support and collaboration extend to the rebuilding of air links, power plants, and investing in health and education sectors as well as helping to train Afghan civil servants, diplomats, and police. In 2005, India proposed Afghanistan's membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Three memorandums of understanding were signed (MOUs) between the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and the Afghan National Standardisation Authority for strengthening cooperation in the fields of rural development, education, and standardization. During Hamid Karzai's visit to India in April 2006. An agreement providing \$50 million to promote bilateral businesses between Afghanistan and India was signed during the visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister Dr. Spanta between 29 June – 1 July 2006. During the same year, India raised its aid package to Afghanistan by \$150 million, to \$750 million. In 2007, Afghanistan finally became the eighth member of SAARC.

In October 2011, India and Afghanistan signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, which strengthened their relations as it provided assistance to help rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions, education and technical assistance to rebuild indigenous Afghan capacity in different areas, Encouraging investment in Afghanistan's natural resources, Providing duty-free access to the Indian market for Afghanistan's exports in support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, broad-based and inclusive process of peace and reconciliation, and Advocating the need for a

sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the international community. In December 2015, India donated three Mi-25 attack helicopters, with the option to send more in the future to Afghanistan as part of the bilateral strategic partnership to counter the Taliban insurgency. Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Kabul on December 25 to open the newly constructed Afghan parliament, which had been built by India for \$90 million.

On 15 August 2019, on Indian Independence Day, Prime Minister Narendra Modi extended greetings to Afghanistan who was due to also celebrate Afghan 100th Independence Day. PM Modi in a statement issued on that day asserted that: “Afghanistan is a good neighbour of India, and I wish the country for celebrating 100 years of independence this year”. President Ashraf Ghani also sent congratulations with the comment “May our friendship last forever.”

Indian Diaspora in Afghanistan

Nearly 1710 Indians are estimated to be present in Afghanistan (August 2020). Most of the Indians are engaged as professionals in Banks, IT firms, construction companies, hospitals, NGOs, telecom companies, security companies, universities, Govt. of India sponsored projects, Govt. of Afghanistan and UN Missions.

Economic Relations between India and Afghanistan.

Salma Dam, officially the Afghan-India Friendship Dam, is a hydroelectric and irrigation dam project located on the Hari River in Chishti Sharif District of Herat Province in western Afghanistan. The Afghan cabinet renamed the Salma Dam to the Afghan-India Friendship Dam in a move to strengthen relations between the two countries. The hydroelectric plant produces 42 MW of power in addition to providing irrigation for 75,000 hectares of farmland (stabilising the existing irrigation of 35,000 hectares and development of irrigation facilities to an additional 40,000 hectares of land). India and Iran are set to ink a transit agreement on transporting goods to landlocked Afghanistan. The Indian government is investing more than US\$100 million in the expansion of the Chabahar port in southeastern Iran, which will serve as a hub for the transportation of transit goods. This port will be used by India to import and export various products like agricultural and mineral products, thereby it can be said as a transit point for Afghanistan and eventually to Central Asia.

India-Afghanistan Air-Freight Corridor, which was inaugurated in 2017 has been useful in carrying goods of value over USD 216 million and this has given an uplift to Afghan exports to India and has also directly benefited the farmers, small traders and exporters in Afghanistan. Now, the aim of both the countries is to expand the Corridor to other cities.

Alarmed by the chaos and upheaval following the Taliban's takeover, India hosted the third regional security dialogue on Afghanistan on Nov. 10-11. The first two meetings of the dialogue, at the level of national security advisers, were held in Tehran in 2018 and 2019. Though all the countries

neighboring Afghanistan were invited, China and Pakistan refused to attend.

Check Your Progress Exercise 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

1) Elucidate on India- Afghanistan Relations.

2.5 INDIA SRI LANKA RELATIONS

Sri Lanka has both advantages and disadvantages of its geopolitical location. It has the advantage of being an island with a location in an ocean that is of considerable strategic importance. It has also the disadvantage of being a small power in a region that has been facing great power rivalry, added to the fact that there is a dominant neighbour, India. The Indian case is further complicated by the existence of a fairly large Tamil minority in the North and North Eastern region of Sri Lanka that has close links to the Tamil population in India. India has been a supporter of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept that Sri Lanka has sponsored. To India this concept helps to keep this region outside the scope of great power rivalry. Both the countries are members of the Commonwealth, the SAARC and the NAM.

Both India and Sri Lanka have had common approaches on such issues as Indonesian independence (1949), Suez crisis (1956) disarmament etc. They have both supported the Zone of Peace proposal and also the attempts to create an Indian Ocean Community in the form of the Indian Ocean Rim land Organization. At a bilateral level the two countries were able to solve two important issues. In 1964, an agreement was signed about the question of citizenship of Tamil migrants and in 1974, the maritime boundary agreement came into effect

Sri Lanka, earlier known as Ceylon (until 1972), is a small island country situated in the Indian Ocean to the south of India. Its total area is 25,332 sq. miles. Of all countries, it has geographical proximity to India. Only 18 miles wide shallow water in the Palk Straits separates Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka from the Southernmost tip of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Its geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean (at the centre of commercial and strategic sea and air routes) and its closeness to US naval base in Diego Garcia indicates its importance far beyond its size, population and resources.

The history of cultural relations between India and Sri Lanka dates back to ancient times. Out of the total population of Sri Lanka, about 64 percent

believe in Buddhism and about 15 percent believe in Hinduism. Sri Lanka became a British colony in the early 19th century. It was granted independence on February 4, 1948. India-Sri Lanka relations have generally been cordial, though there have been occasions of tense relations due to the ethnic conflict between Tamils and the Sinhalese. Despite ethnic problems, India has never sought to impose its will on Sri Lanka and has always based its foreign policy towards this southern neighbour on mutual understanding and friendship. An important area of common interest between the two neighbours is the foreign policy of non-alignment. Sri Lanka has generally stood neutral in Sino-Indian disputes. In fact, it made efforts to mediate between India and China after the war of 1962. Sri Lanka also showed understanding when India became nuclear. In 2005, India extended valuable help to Sri Lanka after the Tsunami devastated the coastal areas of that country.

Problem of Indian Tamils :

Jaffna province of Sri Lanka has large concentration of Tamil population. The problem became serious when Tamilians began demanding a national homeland or "Eelam" in northern Sri Lanka. It is important to understand that there are essentially two categories of Tamilians in Sri Lanka: The Ceylon Tamils whose forefathers had migrated to Sri Lanka centuries ago. They are estimated to be one million. The second category is of Indian Tamils whose forefathers were taken by the Britishers as plantation workers in the 19th century. They are another one million, many of them without citizenship. The problem of their status dominated early India-Sri Lanka relations. The conflict with Ceylon Tamils came later.

The Sinhalese fear Tamil domination, which is the principal reason behind the ethnic conflict. The difference between the two communities was exploited by British rulers in order to check the growing Sinhalese nationalism. The Tamils were allowed to enter the administration structure and thus gradually took control of the trade and profession. Scarce economic resources and opportunities plus the majority pressure from its own people forced the Government of Sri Lanka to pass a series of steps to reduce the importance of Tamils- Indian and the Ceylonese. The representation of Tamilians in public service in 1948 was 30 percent, but by 1975 it had fallen to mere 5 percent. The Sinhalese were encouraged to settle down in Tamil dominated areas in large numbers. The citizenship law of 1948 and 1949 had deprived about 10 lakh Indian Tamils of political rights. The Tamil youth who had lost faith in non-violence organised themselves into Liberation Tigers. The aim of these 'Tigers' is a sovereign Tamil State of Eelam.

The issue of Tamilians, and the policy pursued by the government cast a dark shadow on Indo-Sri Lanka relations. India from time to time complained against the discriminatory policy of the Ceylon government. The agreement of 1964 sought to solve the problem of stateless persons (Indian Tamils) in Sri Lanka. About 3 lakhs of these people were to be granted Sri Lankan citizenship and about 5 lakh 25 thousand persons were to be given citizenship of India. These people were given 15 years' time to

shift to India in installments. Later in 1974, the fate of the remaining 1 lakh 50 thousand stateless persons was decided. It was agreed between the two countries that half of them were to be given citizenship of Sri Lanka and the rest would become Indian nationals. Thus, the issue of stateless persons was sorted out peacefully between the two countries.

A territorial dispute arose between India and Sri Lanka over the ownership of one mile India and the World long and only 300 yard wide small island known as Kacchativu, in 1968. In 1974 under the agreement signed between the two countries, India accepted Sri Lankan ownership of the island.

Tamil Separatism :

The ethnic problem between Tamils and Sinhalese had a long history. It assumed serious proportions in 1983. As the gulf between the communities developed, militancy, separatist organisations became active. Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) demanded separate homeland for Tamils in 1988 – Tamil Eelam. A reign of terror was unleashed against the agitating Tamils in 1983. During 1983 – 86, about 2 lakh Tamils were rendered homeless. The worst racial riots in the history of the country made thousands of Tamils refugees in India.

India offered to help resolve the crisis but it was interpreted as “Indian intervention in Sri Lanka” on behalf of the Tamils. When the situation became grim, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement in 1987. India offered military assistance under the Accord. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to Sri Lanka to help restore normalcy in the country. The deployment of IPKF was also an extension of India’s policy of reminding Sri Lanka and outside powers that if their involvement inside the region were to have an anti-Indian orientation, New Delhi would not remain a mute spectator.

Though the accord of 1987 was a triumph of Indian diplomacy, it proved to be costly for India. India lost about 1200 soldiers and it cost Rs. 2 crore a day on IPKF in the height of its involvement. The worst part was that the Tamils turned against IPKF and a fighting broke out between the two. Rajiv Gandhi, the architect of India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 was assassinated in 1991 at the behest of LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Areas of Mutual Cooperation

Systematic efforts at strengthening economic ties have been taken by India and Sri Lanka since the 1990s, especially after the withdrawal of Indian troops. In 1998, the two countries set up an Indo Sri Lankan Foundation for increasing bilateral exchanges in various fields. They have agreed on a free trade area to facilitate trade, which has gone up greatly. India encouraged Sri Lanka to invite the peace process between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. In 1998 Sri Lanka invited Norway to work out a peaceful solution to the ethnic problem. India stands for unity of Sri Lanka. The greatest milestone of this process was the cease-fire agreement of 2002 between LTTE and Sri Lanka and the revival of the dialogue between the two. From India’s long

term point of view, Norway recognised India's legitimate interests in Sri Lanka and stated that it has no desire to come in the way of any Indian initiative to end the conflict in the region.

India Sri Lanka Issue – The Fishermen Issue

Arrest of Indian fishermen on the Sri Lankan side of the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) in the Palk Straits and the Gulf of Mannar by Sri Lankan authorities has been a long-standing problem with the Sri Lankan Navy firing on Indian fishing vessels. The catch on the Sri Lankan side is better both in terms of quality (high-value prawns) and quantity. The issue started because of Indian fishermen having used mechanised trawlers, which deprived the Sri Lankan fishermen (including Tamils) of their catch and damaged their fishing boats. The Sri Lankan government wants India to ban use of mechanized trawlers in the Palk Strait region, and negotiations on this subject are undergoing. So far, no concrete agreement has been reached since India favours regulating these trawlers instead of banning them altogether.

Check Your Progress Exercise 4

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

1) Elaborate on India- Sri Lanka Relations.

2.6 LET US SUM UP (SUMMARY/ CONCLUSION)

In this module we discussed India's relations with various countries like China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. The module tries to deal with not only the cultural and historical aspect, but also economic, diplomatic and bilateral issues and way forward.

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INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBOUR- II (NEPAL BHUTAN MALDIVES)

Unit Structure :

- 3.0 Objective
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Bangladesh
- 3.3 Myanmar
- 3.4 Maldives
- 3.5 Bhutan
- 3.6 Nepal
- 3.7 Reference

3.0 OBJECTIVE

This course disseminates distinctive outlooks of understanding the making of India's foreign policy keeping in mind its neighbouring countries in contemporary international scenario. It provides critical analysis of politics, economy and strategy of engagements of India's neighbouring countries with rest of the world. It will help students:

- To understand the making of India's World View with special regards to its neighbouring countries.
- To seek to enable engagement with current events, it also
- To explore how India came to be in its current circumstances, the different ways that these can be interpreted,
- To understand the interconnections between the making of India's national circumstances and its international role.
- To pay close attention to the role of global finance, the mediating powers of technology and the emergence of critical regional consciousness in response to changing world politics.
- To develop critical reading skills and gain in-depth understanding of contemporary India and its engagements with its neighbouring countries.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

India's neighbourhood before independence and post-independence differ due to distortion of its borders in the course of time. Before independence

the span of land was from Iran to Indonesia therefore central Asia, Iran and on the other side Indonesia, Malaysia etc. were meant to be India's neighbours. Gradually, these lands witnessed formation of new borders creating new actors in this area defining new neighbourhood close to the country. Added with this India seeks its foreign relationship opportunities in Pacific Ocean defining as extended neighbours of it. Therefore, neighbourhood of India can be defined on the grounds of national interest, areas of connectivity as a nation in terms of culture, commerce, strategy, security and these factors determine India's neighbourhood policy. In this context, the Gulf, the Asia Pacific region, Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean are neighbours of India epitomising SAARC, ASEAN, BIMSTEC etc. Besides this wider perspective of India's neighbourhood, its relation with the immediate neighbours define and design country's neighbourhood policy and projects India as a responsible nation.

India's neighbourhood policy projects respect of sovereignty, dialogue, growth, security and culture as the basis of our foreign policy approach. They have the greatest salience in its immediate neighbourhood as South Asia which is especially a fragmented India. India's foreign policy towards its neighbours has formalised procedures focused upon the development of intra-regional trade and investment, tourism, communication, and energy resources. In its foreign policy particular areas of collaboration is targeted to channel growth and complementarity.

Creation of SAARC in 1985 had an objective to boost of culture, dialogue, commerce, strategy, security, respect and prosperity. For that reason, connectivity and dialogue, both bilateral or multilateral connectivity and physical connectivity, is a fulcrum in the country's South Asian policy.

India's foreign policy actively focuses upon improving ties with India's immediate neighbours Which is often termed as Neighbourhood First policy. India wants a peaceful, prosperous and stable neighbourhood so that there is peace, prosperity and stability in the South Asian region and there is more focus on development. As for example India's SAARC satellite is dedicated for the peace and prosperity in the South Asian region. "Neighbourhood First" is a foreign policy that India has been following ever since 2014. It means that the Indian government focuses more on its ties with its immediate neighbours as compared to its other strategic partners evidently SAARC and BIMSTEC members were invited in 2014 and 2019. The state's response to the challenges has been to assert its Neighbourhood First and Security and Growth for All in the Region strategies as foreign policy priorities. India has also upped its game on infrastructure delivery, particularly for regional connectivity in the past year.

India's smaller neighbours are at a stage of growing developmental needs. At such a time, both India and its neighbours can benefit from this opportunity. India can invest in these countries, building stronger trade as well as political ties. This neighbourhood aid includes Completing railway lines to Bangladesh and Nepal, Riverine projects, ferry service to the Maldives, identifying other services to Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean Region islands also considering debt waiver requests from its neighbours. But,

China, another economic giant in the region has been running interference in India's aspirations. Chinese projects have faster delivery schedules, easier implementation, and easier financing mechanisms. But, along with them come debt traps, which smaller countries are not able to figure out. India started out with creating cordial relations with all its neighbours including Pakistan and China. But, over the years, due to Pakistan abetted terrorism and separatism, the government has decided to turn a cold shoulder towards Pakistan. Also, any ties with China have lost their significance due to increasing support of China to Pakistan and CPEC invading POK.

India's neighbourhood policy concentrates over the maintenance of peace and security in this region against China so it became more flexible about the entry of other powers to help counter China's influence in the region. India appreciated the recent U.S.- Maldives new military dialogue. Moreover, US Millennium Challenge Corporation's projects in Afghanistan, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh are also finding more space against Chinese influence. QUAD will collaborate on security and infrastructure initiatives in the Indian neighbourhood, along with promoting forays by other partners like the U.K., France and Germany in the region. India intends to resolve the nearly ten-month-long military standoff diplomatically and bilaterally.

3.2 BANGLADESH

Bangladesh is one of India's Neighbouring Countries. India shares the longest international border with Bangladesh about 4,096.7 Kms. Both the countries marked their 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2021. Bangladesh and India are common members of SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA and the Commonwealth. India-Bangladesh relations have significant position in India's neighbourhood and Act East policy both. India has benefited a lot from the neighbourhood-first policy. The two countries share many cultural ties. In particular, Bangladesh and the east Indian state of West Bengal are Bengali-speaking. In 1971, the Bangladesh Liberation War broke out between East Pakistan and West Pakistan; India intervened in December 1971 in support of East Pakistan and helped secure its independence from Pakistan as the country of Bangladesh. On 6 December, Bangladesh and India celebrate Friendship Day commemorating India's recognition of Bangladesh and the continued friendship between the two countries.

India and Bangladesh expanded their relationship in all dimensions ranging from security, trade, transport and connectivity, culture, people to people ties, energy, joint development of shared resources to defence. Bangladesh has provided India with excellent strategic opportunities that would help to change the geopolitical situation of South Asia. Under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has built closer ties with India. Bangladesh is the largest recipient of 9 million doses of made in India vaccine.

India and Bangladesh have been working hard to maintain cordial relations between the both and now have decided to explore new areas of cooperation

including latest technologies, disaster management, artificial intelligence, ecology and conservation and greater youth to youth engagement to give further momentum to their burgeoning ties. In keeping with India's Neighbourhood First Policy Bangladesh plans to accord priority in the areas of vaccines and therapeutics. Mutual Delegation visits keep the warmth of relations through various agreements and ties. Besides these friendship grounds India and Bangladesh have several areas of disputation that brings out bitterness in relations.

A major area of contention has been the construction and operation of the Farakka Barrage by India to increase water supply in the River Hooghly. There have also been disputes regarding the indefinite nature of the lease for transferring of Teen Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh that India leased three bigha land to Bangladesh in 1992 to connect this enclave with mainland Bangladesh. Part of Bangladesh is surrounded by the Indian state of West Bengal which was resolved by a mutual agreement between India and Bangladesh in 2011. Another issue of terrorist activities carried out by outfits based in both countries that was recently focused in a joint agreement to fight terrorism. Siliguri Corridor or "India's Chicken Neck" is another concern between the two nations which is less than 27 kilometres wide, remained as the only bridge between the north-eastern part of India and the rest of the country. Because Bangladesh has consistently denied India transit facility to the landlocked North Eastern Regions of India.

Illegal Bangladeshi immigration into India. Bangladeshi officials have denied the existence of Bangladeshis living in India This has considerable repercussions for smooth relations of both the countries. Continuous border killing of Bangladeshi people by Indian border guards, aiding illegal immigrants, helping in armed dacoity, fake money transfers and illegal drug trades by both Indian and Bangladeshi people are the major problems between Bangladesh and India. Apart from this, both Bangladesh and India made claims over the same seawater at the Bay of Bengal before settlement of the issue.

Besides these issues they both shared coordination between them. With the onset of economic liberalization in South Asia, they forged greater bilateral engagement and trade. The historic Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was concluded in 1996. India and Bangladesh are close strategic partners in counter-terrorism. They are also the largest trading partners in South Asia. In the course of development of warm relations in 2015 the Indian Parliament, in the presence of Bangladeshi diplomats, unanimously passed the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) as its 100th Constitutional amendment, thereby resolving all 68-year-old border disputes since the end of the British Raj. Therefore, neighbouring country policy of India towards Bangladesh has numerous scope of development to make this region developed, peaceful and secure which is the need of century to achieve many more targets along with SDGs.

Check your progress Exercise 1-

1) Explain the cooperative mode of relations between India and Bangladesh.

2) How did India played a good neighbour for Bangladesh during Covid-19

3.3 MYANMAR

India-Myanmar is another bilateral form of relations making India's neighbouring policy a great remark. Their relations are rooted in shared historical, ethnic, cultural and religious ties. Myanmar being the land of Lord Buddha, India is a country of pilgrimage for the people of Myanmar. India and Myanmar relations have stood the test of time together for many years. The geographical proximity of the two countries has also helped develop and sustain cordial relations and facilitated people-to-people contact. India and Myanmar share a long land border of over 1600 km and a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. A large population of Indian origin (according to some estimates about 2.5 million) lives in Myanmar. India and Myanmar signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1951 which marks the cordial relations between the both.

In order to extend the warm relations between India and Myanmar, a number of agreements for enhancing bilateral cooperation have been signed between the two countries. Institutional mechanisms for facilitating regular dialogue on a range of issues of bilateral interest have also been established. Indian Consulate General in Mandalay was re-opened in 2002 and the Consulate General of Myanmar was set up in Kolkata. India has been responsive to the needs of Myanmar and has been providing relief materials and assistance during its hard times or natural disasters. India also provided assistance for humanitarian relief and rehabilitation in the areas affected by the severe earthquake in Shan State in March 2011 and to the communal riot affected people of Rakhine State in August 2012.

Development of cooperation is a key of international relations and in order to act upon neighbourhood first policy India has offered technical and financial assistance for projects in Myanmar, both in infrastructural and non- infrastructural areas. These include a national centre of excellence like the Myanmar Institute of Information Technology (MIIT); an Advanced Centre for Agricultural Research and Education (ACARE) along with a Rice Bio Park in Myanmar. Recognising the importance of connectivity, India in coordination with Myanmar is implementing the various connectivity projects: Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, building/upgrading 71 bridges on the Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road; pledged to construct/upgrade the Kalewa-Yargyi section of the trilateral highway which envisaged seamless connectivity between India, Myanmar and Thailand. A bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia, Myanmar has loomed large on India's diplomatic horizon. Blending business, culture, and diplomacy, there is a strong connection between the two countries on the grounds of Buddhism, trade and commerce, entertainment, art and culture.

Myanmar has significance for India from a geopolitical point of view as it geographically stands at the crossroads of India-Southeast relations. Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country that shares a land border with northeastern India, stretching around 1,624 kilometers and a 725-km maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. Being the only country that fits in at the intersection of India's "Neighborhood First" policy and its "Look East" policy, Myanmar is an essential element in India's practice of regional diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific and serves as a land bridge to connect South Asia and Southeast Asia. In recognition of this importance, Myanmar was given the status of observer in SAARC in August 2008. It is therefore in India's interest to see Myanmar prevail as a stable and autonomous country, thereby making possible greater bilateral engagement in India-Myanmar relations. As per other cooperative actions Myanmar is a bridge between India and ASEAN. A few proposals for cooperation have been implemented and some are under discussions with Myanmar within the framework of ASEAN's IAI program. Apart from this BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperations have also established the grounds of cooperation between the two countries. Beyond this alignment the relations are now acquiring greater economic weight and strategic orientation.

Check your progress Exercise 2-

1) Critically examine the grounds of cooperation between India and Myanmar.

2. How India played a major roles in developing its neighbourhood first policy towards Myanmar?

3.4 MALDIVES

Maldives cannot be ignored while discussing about the neighbourhood first policy of India. India was among the first to recognise Maldives after its independence in 1965 and to establish diplomatic relations with the country.

India and Maldives share ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and commercial links steeped in antiquity and enjoy close, cordial and multi-dimensional relations. Relations between India and Maldives have been traditionally warm. Maldives is currently being encouraged by the developed and developing countries despite its small size. Because of Strategic Importance of the Geographic Location of the Maldives with respect to Key International Shipping Lanes. The Indian Ocean is a key highway for global trade and energy flows. The Maldives is geographically positioned like a 'toll gate' between the western Indian Ocean checkpoints of the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz on the one hand, and the eastern Indian Ocean chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca on the other.

It is extremely important for India's strength in blue economy through sustainable management and utilisation of marine resources. Maldives has importance for political stability and security in the Indian Ocean Neighbourhood and protection of Indian trade and investment. They extend a mutual responsibility in maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean. India looks at Maldives supporting the Pacific strategy of the Quad as a strategic arrangement between India, US, Japan and Australia. Like a biggest challenge of terrorism for India Maldives is also deeply affected by radical elements.

Maldives is cooperative with India in anti-terror operations. India and Maldives are also engaged in deep defence cooperation as well as in counterterrorism measures. Both sides held their strategic meetings of the Joint Working Group on counterterrorism, countering violent extremism and de-radicalization. As a global support Maldives supported India's permanent membership and India's candidature for a non- permanent seat to the year 2020-21. Both are members of commonwealth and have supported each other on international forums such as NAM and the SAARC. India and Maldives have consistently supported each other in multilateral fora such as the UN, the Commonwealth, the NAM and the SAARC. These relations are not limited to security.

Bilateral relations have been nurtured and strengthened by regular contacts at the highest levels. Since establishment of diplomatic relations, almost all Prime Ministers of India visited the Maldives. India and the Maldives have maintained their air bubble system even during the COVID pandemic. On 26th August, 2021, India and Maldives signed the famous mega Greater Malé Connectivity project (GMCP) contract, for construction of a 6.74 km long bridge and causeway link connecting the capital Malé with the adjoining islands of Villingli, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi. This is not only the largest infrastructure project in Maldives, but also one of the biggest new development projects by India in its neighbourhood in recent years. For that reason, there are various grounds of cooperation between the two apart from some differences which are to be nurtured removing the basis of disputes.

Maldives regarded Indians and India as a friend and trusted neighbour in the economic, social and political fields, although there has been a strong anti-India stance taken by some sections of the society, expressed under the 'India Out' campaign but both the countries share historical and cultural ties. During Covid 19 crisis India raised a gesture of strong cooperative relations by providing \$150 million currency swap support to help Maldives mitigate the financial impact of COVID-19 and essential medicines, hospital consumables, essential food grains and edibles despite logistical challenges in wake of lockdown to Maldives, as part of 'Operation Sanjeevani'. Henceforth, there are many other areas of cooperation between India and Maldives.

Check your progress Exercise 3-

1) Explain the steps taken by India and Maldives to establish cooperation between the two.

2) Explain the areas of difference between India and Maldives. How will they be removed to make this area peaceful?

3.5 BHUTAN

Indian neighbourhood policy is not complete without engaging with Bhutan that shares a 605 kilometres (376 mi) border with India and is its largest trading partner, accounting for 98 percent of its exports and 90 percent of its imports. Bhutan was one of the first to recognize India's independence in 1947 and both nations fostered close relations. The importance of their relations augmented by the annexation of Tibet in 1950 by the People's Republic of China and its border disputes with both Bhutan and India. India signed the Treaty of Friendship with Bhutan, calling for peace between the two nations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs in 1949 which they are maintaining since years.

As per the observation under the neighbourhood policy of India and SAARC member relations diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan were established in 1968 with a special office opened by India in Thimphu. The fundamental background of India- Bhutan bilateral relations is the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1949 between the two countries and revised in February 2007. The Golden Jubilee of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan was celebrated in the year 2018. India and Bhutan both enthusiastically share a unique and time tested bilateral relationship, characterized by utmost trust, goodwill and mutual understanding, which is the highlighting factor of relations of the both.

India consistent with its neighbourhood policy and being in the role of big brother in SAARC, the special relationship has been sustained by a tradition of regular high level visits and dialogues between the two countries. Government of India has consistently supported the socio-economic development of Bhutan. Hydro-power cooperation between the two countries is an evident example of a creative and developmental cooperation. India has been extending economic assistance to Bhutan's socio-economic development since the early 1960s when Bhutan launched its Five Year Plans. India continues to be the principal development partner of Bhutan which is the symbol of growing coordination in South Asian region under the neighbourhood policy of India.

The key areas of focus of GOI's assistance include agriculture and irrigation development, ICT, health, industrial development, road transport, energy, civil aviation, urban development, human resource development, capacity building, scholarship, education and culture. Mutually beneficial hydro-power cooperation with Bhutan forms the core of bilateral economic cooperation. For Bhutan, hydro-power development continues to be a vivacious compound for socio-economic development in the country which has been taken by India as the ground of The current cooperation between India and Bhutan in the hydro-power sector is covered under the 2006 bilateral agreement for cooperation and its Protocol signed in 2009. Four hydro-electric projects (HEPs) totalling 2136 MW are already operational in Bhutan and are supplying electricity to India.

India is Bhutan's largest trading partner since years and in 2018, total bilateral trade between the two countries raised at Rs. 9227.7 crores. Major exports from India to Bhutan are mineral products, machinery and mechanical appliances, electrical equipment, base metals, vehicles, vegetable products, plastics and articles.

It is noteworthy that, India is the most popular educational destination for Bhutanese students and just about 4000 Bhutanese students are registered in Indian Universities. Many of the students are provided scholarship by Government of India to nurture the international relations in all possible manner. There are exciting cultural exchanges between the two countries. Having the common cultural faith, a number of Bhutanese pilgrims travel to holy Buddhist sites in India. Reflecting the special nature of the relationship, the two countries share an open border with regular exchange of travellers in both directions for work, tourism, shopping, medical care etc. Consequently, India's international policy accountable to the peace and security and overall growth in its surroundings has joined hands with Bhutan to grow along for the development of South Asian region and a cooperative neighbourhood.

Check your progress Exercise 4-

1) On what grounds India and Bhutan maintain the relations with each other? Examine.

2) How will India – Bhutan relations prove to be a fortification against Chinese rising impact in South Asia?

3.6 NEPAL

India-Nepal bilateral relations founded on the longstanding connection of history, culture, tradition and religion, these relations are close, comprehensive and multidimensional and are marked more in political, social, cultural, religious and economic engagements with each other. India-Nepal relations were initiated by the two with the treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950 and accompanying security relations between the both. Both of them share common culture and history with each other having an approximately an 1,800- kilometre long open border.

The two countries established diplomatic relations on 17 June 1947 with an unwavering commitment to the principles of peaceful coexistence, sovereign equality, and understanding of each other's aspirations and sensitivities. It has been the firm foundation on which our bilateral relations have been growing further. The open border between the two countries remains a unique feature of international relations. Frontier without restriction has greatly facilitated the free movements of people to each other's territory and enhanced interactions along with the essence of notable political relations.

High level diplomatic visits of the delegates from India and Nepal have been a key development in partnership of the two. India proposed strong support and solidarity to Nepal whenever it was required. The people and Government of India supported Nepal in advancing its home-grown peace process as well as in the process of writing the Constitution through the elected Constituent Assembly.

Notably, the recent issues of border between India and Nepal is that the borders have been demarcated on the basis of a flowing river and Kalapani area is the largest territorial dispute between Nepal and India. It is a tri-junction between India, China and Nepal which is of strategic significance in South Asian diplomacy. The Lipulekh pass also is a far western point near Kalapani, a disputed border area between Nepal and India adding tensions between the both. Here comes the concern of India regarding the increasing impact of China in this area which is undeniably harmful for South Asian peace and security.

China opening port facilities to Nepal and providing access to Trans Himalayan Railway reduces Nepal's dependency on India and reduces the leverage that India has with the Nepal to settle the dispute. India's Big Brotherly attitude towards Nepal has also been taken a sense of insecurity in the Nepalese government and its citizens and any settlement would be seen as a weakness. Moreover, Nepal's internal politics has also faced deeply divided and unstable democracy that demands India's high responsibilities to make efforts regarding stable and peaceful relations between the both.

Check your progress Exercise 5-

1) Explain the neighbourhood policy of India towards Nepal.

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BILATERAL ISSUES

Unit Structure :

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4.7 Suggested Readings/ References

BDR- Border Guards Bangladesh

UNCLOS- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

PCA- The Permanent Court of Arbitration

EEZ- Exclusive Economic Zone

LTTE war- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or the LTTE, in 1976

4.0 OBJECTIVE

The objective of this unit is to critically examine India's relations with its neighbours, namely Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh and China. The relationship has been analysed from a variety of angles including bilateral issues such as land and maritime boundary concerns. After this Unit student should be able to critically analyse India's policies toward its neighbours as well as identify the primary challenges that strain India's bilateral relations with its neighbours.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

India is a country where the people believe in co-operation and maintain healthy relations with the neighbouring countries. India is Progressive industrial country and has growing international influence and an important voice in global trade. It has a long history of working with other countries, is a member of the BRICS, and is a key player in the developing world. Also it includes founding members of Many International Organisations, including the United Nations, The Asian Development Bank, major G-20 economies, and the Non-Aligned Movement.

The coastline of India is about 7500 km. and it has Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of about 23 thousand square kilometers and has maritime borders with 7 countries (Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia). The successful demarcation of maritime boundaries is essential for peaceful and friendly relations with neighbours, national security, scientific discovery and maritime cooperation on a range of issues such as the sustainable use of EEZ marine resources, educating the fishermen on various problems like piracy disaster management, security cooperation, etc.

Despite well-defined borders, maritime disputes are still prevalent as countries fight over inhabited and uninhabited islands. Seen from space, one fact is obvious: the main feature is water. In fact, about 70% of the planet is covered in water, and most of the planet is covered in frozen water around the North Pole and Antarctica.

4.2 LAND AND SEA BORDER ISSUES

4.2.1 India and Bangladesh:

Bangladesh is one of the closest neighbours. India recognized Bangladesh as a separate and independent state on December 6, 1971. In 1971, India fought alongside Bangladeshis to liberate the country from West Pakistan. Bangladesh and India have a lot in common when it comes to traditions. They are friends and the two countries are making great efforts to resolve the Ganges water issue in the Farakka and Tin Bigha corridor in a spirit of compromise. India helped Bangladesh to rescue the victims of the cyclone in 1985. In general, relations between the two countries remain friendly. But the main problem with these two countries is that around 145,000

Chakma refugees cross the Indian border. Bangladesh's relationship with India after 1976 was complicated by disputes over irrigation and land borders. However, India maintained positive relations with Bangladesh during the Awami League government in 1972 and 1996. Resolution of land and sea disputes eliminated the problems in ties.

Padua, part of the Sylhet division until 1971, was under Indian control after the 1971 war. This small patch of land was re-occupied by the BDRs in 2001 but later returned to India after the Bangladeshi government decided to resolve the matter through diplomatic negotiation. The Indian island of New Moore no longer exists, but Bangladesh has repeatedly claimed to be part of the Satkhira district of Bangladesh.

India complains more and more about the poor security of the Bangladesh border. It fears a growing influx of poor Bangladeshis and accuses Bangladesh of hosting Indian separatist groups such as ULFA and suspected terrorist groups. The Bangladeshi government refused to accept these allegations. India estimates that over 20 million Bangladeshis reside illegally in India.

Since 2002, India has built a fence between India and Bangladesh along much of the 2,500-mile border. Bangladesh participated in maritime border arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on 8 October 2009. The Tribunal concluded its proceedings in The Hague on 18 December 2013. The verdict was carried out and the United Nations supplied Bangladesh with 19,467 square kilometers. Over 25,602 square kilometers in the Bay of Bengal area in an unprecedented decision, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (PCA) granted Bangladesh a territory of 19,467 square kilometers. This represents four-fifths of the total land area of 25,602 square kilometers disputed on 7 July in the Bay of Bengal and at India's maritime borders. The United Nations rulings clearly show the maritime border between India and Bangladesh in territorial waters, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and a continental shelf of more than 200 square kilometers (nautical miles).

Bangladesh's maritime boundaries have now been expanded to 118,813 square feet, including the EEZ, which covers 12 nautical miles of territorial waters and up to 200 nautical miles of high seas. In addition, the ruling recognizes Bangladesh's sovereignty over the underwater resources of the 345 nautical mile continental shelf on the high seas, with the Chittagong coast as the baseline. This decision was widely accepted by both countries as a positive step towards further strengthening friendly relations, especially given the strategic / political and geographical importance of the Indian Ocean and South Asian territories. In addition, the award has a wide range of economic and security implications not only for India and Bangladesh, but for the entire Bay of Bengal region. It is also believed that this decision will help the new Government of India ratify the Land Boundary Agreement and better understand the issue of sharing water between Bangladesh and the Teesta River. This resolution will help establish strategic partnerships between countries adjacent to the Persian Gulf.

4.2.2 India and Nepal:

India and Nepal are currently in a border dispute over the Kalapani-Limpiyadhura-River intersection between India-Nepal and China and the Susta region (Champaran region, western Bihar). Located on the Kailash Mansarovar route Kalapani is conveniently located over 20,000 feet and acts as an observation post for the area.

The disagreement in the location of the water sources of the Kali River led to a border dispute between India and Nepal, and countries created maps to support their claims. Another Susta is now in the Trivenistast in the Lumbini Zone of Nepal, a conflict area near Nichlaul, Uttar Pradesh, India. The disputed area is over 14,000 hectares (140 square kilometers) and is managed by Nepal.

Despite being claimed by Nepal, Kalapani has been run by the Indian-Tibetan border police of India since the 1962 border war with China. This disagreement in the location of the river's water sources led to a border dispute between India and Nepal, and countries created maps to support their claims. India has released a new political map that includes the entire Kalapani of India without the consent of Nepal. Nepal then released a new national map that includes 300 square kilometers (115 square miles) of mountainous areas, including Lipre, Rimpiyadur and Karapani, which now belong to India.

The Kali River flows from the stream of Limpiyadhura, northwest of Lipu Lekh which has been removed from the map of the country by the King to win the support of India. King Mahendra wanted to help India ensure its security as China's threats are persistently recognized. Kalapani was not involved in the conflict between Nepal and India. The Kali River runs well below the Lipu-lekh pass, and the Sugauli Treaty does not limit the area north of these channels.

4.2.3 India and Sri Lanka:

India and Sri Lanka have maritime borders. The Palk Strait, a shallow sea 30 km wide, lies between the two countries. Peace generally dominated the India-Sri Lanka border issue, but there were tensions over ownership of Kachchatheevu Island in the Palk Strait. It was given to Sri Lanka by India in 1974. Through the 1974-1976 agreement, India was able to define the maritime boundary with Sri Lanka. However, some problems have recently arisen with the fishermen and the island of Kachchatheevu, which has caused confusion.

Kachchatheevu issue:

Under the 1974 agreement, borders were agreed on the basis of the "modified equidistance line". And the island of Kachchatheevu was given to Sri Lanka and had special provisions to enable it to continue to be used for pilgrimages, drying nets and the free movement of ships as before. However, fishing was not explicitly mentioned.

Indian fishermen have claimed their traditional fishing rights in areas denied by Sri Lankan authorities. However, these rights are not mentioned by common agreement. This infuriated the Indian fishermen.

In 2014, the government of Tamil Nadu appealed to the Supreme Court to overturn the transfer of the island to Sri Lanka because it was not approved by parliament. However, the Indian government said the island had not been moved but was a disputed area and was therefore allocated during the boundary resolution process. (In the case of the Berubari Union, it was decided that the resolution of the territorial dispute does not require parliamentary approval.)

The fisherman's problem:

Historical fishing by a fishing community in the same area of narrow waters between the two countries is now a problem due to security and threats to the ecosystem.

The issue of Indian fishermen staying in Sri Lankan waters became more prominent after the Sri Lankan Navy began exercising increased control and vigilance against the Palk Strait during the Tamil Elam War. This was an attempt by the Navy to prevent arms smuggling and other illegal activities. In the process, they shot enraged Indian fishermen multiple times.

Security remains tight after the end of the LTTE war. In addition to this, restrictions on Sri Lankan fishermen have been eased and the use of advanced technology by Indian fishermen has compounded the problem. This problem is more related to technical and administrative measures than to maritime disputes and must be resolved accordingly.

4.2.4 India and China:

Located in the northwestern part of the Aksai Chin Tibetan Plateau and operated by China and parts of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, it measures approximately 35,241 square kilometers. India regards it as part of the union territory of Ladakh. The Dopsang Plains are located on the border between the Union Territory of Ladakh and the conflict zone of Aksai Chin. Chinese troops dominated most of the plains during the 1962 war with India, and India dominated the western part of the plains. Demchok and Chumar both are located in Leh district of Ladakh and are dominated by India. It is located in the Kinnaur district of Kaurik, Himachal Pradesh. Nelang, Pulam Sumda, Sang, Jadhag, Lapthal: Uttarkashi district in Uttarakhand. Located in Chamoli district of Barahoti Uttarakhand, its pasture is also in Uttarakhand and is disputed by China, which is controlled by India.

The approximately 5,800 square kilometers (2,239 sq mi) area along both sides of the Transkara Column Tract Shaksgam River is entirely managed by China as part of Kargilik County in Kashgar Province, Autonomous Region from Xinjiang.

It was claimed by Pakistan until 1963 and again by India as part of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan dropped its claims over the region in 1963 as part of a border agreement with China, on the condition that the agreement is subject to the final resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Arunachal Pradesh was created on January 20, 1972 and is a state in India located in the far northeast. Most of the territory is claimed by China as part of southern Tibet.

4.2.5 India and Pakistan

Jammu and Kashmir this is the center of the great dispute between Pakistan and India. Three wars opposed the two countries for Jammu and Kashmir. India controls the entire Siachen Glacier itself, including all tributary glaciers. The maritime dispute between India and Pakistan results in the demarcation of the border along Sir Creek. Sir Creek will also provide the reference point for the maritime boundary demarcation. Sir Creek is a tidal estuary that exists on the border between India and Pakistan (State of Gujarat and province of Sindh). The land boundary between the countries up to Western Terminus was set by the United Nations tribunal, but from there it left the boundary undefined.

According to the views of Pakistan, the border is located on the eastern flank of the creek (i.e. part of the creek of Pakistan) and shows the agreement signed in 1914 between the government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj of Kutch for strengthen its point.

On the other hand, India has also used the same document and the "Thalweg Doctrine" to state that the boundary is between watercourses. The Thalweg Doctrine says that the boundary line should be halfway through a navigable channel. India also shows the 1914 document which states that the creek is navigable at high tide and states that the pillars installed in 1924 were along the central course.

Pakistan contradicts India's assertion by saying that the watercourse is not a tidal river and that the Thalweg Doctrine can only be used in the case of tidal rivers. Another important point is that Sir Creek changes course frequently and this creates difficulties in demarcation of boundaries. Once the borders are defined, it would help determine the sea borders which are drawn as an extension of the landmarks on land. Maritime borders also eliminate the limits of (EEZ) and continental shelves. The demarcation would also prevent the involuntary passage of fishermen from both nations into their respective territories.

4.3 WATER SHARING ISSUE

India faces water-related conflicts not only between states but also with neighboring countries. In much of South Asia, water remains a politically contested issue. The region faces water shortages and agricultural challenges and will continue to face increasing demand for energy and water through rapid industrialization. With around 23 million pumps in operation in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan, over pumping of groundwater is

of particular concern. With growing energy needs, stable water levels could lead to a review of the Bilateral Water Sharing Treaty in the future.

4.3.1 India-China Water Dispute

The Brahmaputra and the glaciers that feed the Ganges are of Chinese origin. China remains in a favorable position as an upstream riparian region and can build infrastructure to deliberately impede the flow of water downstream. There is a trust gap between the two neighbors due to the past tendency for the Chinese to be reluctant to provide details on hydropower projects.

China's plan to build a dam and divide water along the Brahmaputra River (called Brahmaputra in China) has signed several memoranda on boosting communication and trust, but its two neighbors are a source of tension between them. As low-lying countries, India and Bangladesh depend on water from the Brahmaputra for agriculture. China is currently planning to build four more dams in Brahmaputra, Tibet. India and Bangladesh fear the dams will give Beijing the ability to divert and store water in the event of a political crisis.

As part of this, India built a dam on the Teesta River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra, to take advantage of the flow of the Teesta during the dry season.

4.3.2 India and Bangladesh Water Dispute

India and Bangladesh share 54 rivers, most of which originate in India or Nepal. Much of the contention over river waters between India and Bangladesh is linked to the Farakka Dam. The Farakka conflict dates back to 1951. At that time, India unilaterally announced plans to blockade the rapidly fleeing port of Calcutta, 18 km upstream from the border. This caused a strong protest from Pakistan (Bangladesh was then called East Pakistan and was part of Pakistan).

Under the 1977 agreement, if the actual available quantity of the Ganges at Farakka during a particular lean season is more or less than the quantity stated in Article 2(i), then at the rate applicable at that time. share. When not available, the article protected at least 80% of the minimum share of Bangladesh.

Therefore, Bangladesh was guaranteed at least 35,500 cusecs of water in a normal year and at least 80 percent of 34,500 cusecs, or 27,600 cusecs of water, if less available a given year. The agreement was for five years, but the agreement was extended by mutual agreement. The long-term solution bypassed the Joint River Commission. The 1977 agreement expired and was immediately extended. Rajiv Gandhi got off to a great start and finally agreed to bring him to Nepal in 1986, but negotiations fell through.

In 1996, the then Prime Minister of India, Mr. HD Deve Gowda has signed an agreement with her Bangladeshi counterpart Sheikh Hasina to end the

water conflict between the two countries. The contract contains the preamble, 12 articles and two annexes.

4.3.3 India and Pakistan Water Dispute

India and Pakistan have been involved in the Indus water conflict since the separation of India in 1947. In 1948, Eastern Punjab (India) and Western Punjab (Pakistan) are Indus waters. However, in the same year, a treaty was signed to restore the water supply. However, water disputes between the two countries continue.

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 and negotiated with the support of the World Bank. The treaty assigned three eastern rivers, the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi rivers, to India and the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum rivers to Pakistan. The agreement began as a comprehensive plan for the use of water in the Indus River system.

Under the 1960 Convention, India and Pakistan established two permanent commissioner posts in Indus waters. Located in India and Pakistan respectively, they represent their respective governments in all treaty matters and serve as a regular communication channel. Regarding the implementation of the treaty under the treaty, the J and K states' ability to divert water is limited and Pakistan opposes the proposed use of river water in the state construction. The Tulbul Navigation Project is a riverside project that has been on fire for several years due to opposition from the Pakistani government, although it does not block the flow of the river.

The Indus Treaty was hailed as a satisfactory solution to the larger river basin conflict, but in recent years it has supported Pakistan by assigning the country the largest river flow and India is superior, a country that has been criticized for stealing its advantages.

The abandonment of treaties, especially those supported by the World Bank, will set a precedent for damaging India's record as a responsible country. Other countries have not accepted the long-standing agreement, but the abolition of the Indus Waters Treaty will be done to India by each of the neighboring countries (such as Nepal and Bangladesh) which have a river water treaty with the 'India.

4.3.4 India and Nepal Water Dispute

India is also involved in the water dispute with Nepal. The Tanakpur and Pancheswar projects are two major controversial issues related to water sharing between the two countries.

In 1996, India and Nepal signed a historic treaty on the integrated development of the Mahakali River for sharing water and electricity. The treaty included decisions on the long-term multi-purpose Pancheswar project and the Tanakpur dam project. Under the treaty, India will provide Nepal with an additional 50 million units of energy and 150 Cusec of water from the 120 MW Tanakpur project in exchange for 2.9 hectares of Nepalese land on the eastern border of Tanakpur built.

Despite this treaty, which is more beneficial to Nepal, the sharing of water and energy from the Tanakpur dam, entirely on the Sharda or Mahakali rivers in India, this issue remains a problem in Nepal, India. In addition to the interstate and international disputes over water sharing mentioned above, there are many other disputes related to water resources, such as disputes over large dams, rural water, water supply, rural and urban water and water pollution disputes. Therefore, what is needed today is to develop a unanimous solution for the equitable distribution of important resources such as water. You should also check for improper use of water.

4.3.5 India–Bhutan Water Dispute

Hydropower cooperation between India and Bhutan started over 50 years ago. The partnership began with the building of small-scale hydropower projects like Tara, Chuka, and Kurichu. Bhutan has the capacity to produce 30,000 megawatts of hydropower. In 2006, the two countries signed a 35-year power purchase agreement, allowing India to generate and import 5,000 MW of hydropower from Bhutan. This rose to 10,000 MW in 2008. Bhutanese, on the other hand, oppose such projects because of their long-term national impact. For example, if Bhutan decides to build a storage project, the problem becomes more serious and problematic when it comes to dealing with India.

4.4 CROSS BORDER TERRORISM, MIGRATION AND TERRORISM

The term "cross-border" refers to the cross-border movement or activity between two countries. Cross-border terrorism is a form of terrorism in neighboring countries that uses a country's soil. Being a conflict in the gray area, it is an undeclared war and is considered the best strategy to bleed the country for a long period of time with little effort.

4.4.1 Cross-Border Terrorism in India

Thousands of civilians have died in terrorist acts over the past two decades. However, thousands of defense, paramilitary and police personnel sacrificed their lives to carry out their duties. Drugs, weapons, invasion of arms and cross-border smuggling have always been a constant and absolute concern for all parties governing the border.

India and Pakistan have a 3,323-kilometer border that stretches through Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, and J&K. Direct access to the border and specific technological developments that allow for the rapid passage of information and the transfer of funds have changed the direction and the content of border security. Pakistan's cross-border terrorism has been exacerbated by its terrorist groups' lack of border awareness and their success in gaining legitimacy on the basis of their religious or ethnic identity. Pakistan's inadequate cooperation makes border control even more difficult for India.

The border between India and Bangladesh (4,096 km) crosses West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. The entire stretch is made up of plains, river belts, hills and jungles which facilitate illegal immigrants. This illegal cross-border immigrant poses a serious security threat and serves as a breeding ground for organizations like Pakistan's Inter-service Intelligence to enter and expand their businesses. Furthermore, poor legality and order at the border have led to the smuggling of weapons and drugs. The supply of weapons helps to maintain any conflict.

In Indian Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh, India share a 3,488-kilometer border with China. This border remains relatively low for illegal immigrants, but is a source of constant vigilance against Indian troops. India has a long-standing border dispute with Aksai Chin and China dating back to the British era in Arunachal Pradesh.

The border between India and Nepal (1,751 km) is an open border, meaning that people from both countries can cross the border from anywhere, despite the existence of border crossings at several locations. Anti-Indian organizations use this border to establish people on Indian Territory. In addition, the smuggling of gold, firearms, drugs and counterfeit money helps terrorists carry out attacks.

This 699-kilometer boundary runs through Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, West Bengal, and Sikkim. The illegal setting up of camps by militant groups in the dense jungles of southeastern Bhutan will help Indian militants carry out anti-Indian activities.

Myanmar shares a border with the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram (1,643). In Myanmar, several rebel groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the United Liberation Front of Myanmar (ULFA) exist, posing a security concern to both India and Myanmar.

4.4.2 Migration and Terrorism

Immigration and terrorism There are around 10-20 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in India, and uncontrolled and unregulated migration flows and high fertility rates can lead to explosive situations. While urbanization stimulates immigration to developed countries, the author has emphasized the loose control of immigrants, which allows the spread of terrorism and thus compromises internal security.

In India, attempts to restrict illegal immigration have been made, however they have proven to be ineffective. The author said that the socio-political movement that the Assamese started in 1979 to expel illegal Bengalis ended with the Assamese Accord in 1985. Chiring Chapori Yuva Mancha, a youth movement, initiated a campaign against illegal immigrants from Bangladesh in April 2005. Illegal Bangladeshi immigrants are also a threat to Assam's language and culture. The ULFA, which began as a protest against Bengali, only lost credibility when the leaders were evacuated to Bangladesh after a Bhutanese operation against the group in December

2003. The arrest of Bengali citizen SM Alam by Assam police in January 2008 plan to turn the northeastern part of the ISI into an unstable area. Immigrants are also spreading to other places such as Dimapur and Kohima. Illegal immigrants are less involved in terrorism, but are involved in arms trafficking, counterfeit money rackets, and drug trafficking.

This terrorist calculus could be affected in two ways as a result of the change. For starters, it has the potential to reduce the cost of terrorism. Foreign terrorist organisations, for example, use existing migratory networks and routes to transport terrorist agents (e.g., in the form of "sleeper cells") to foreign nations at a minimal cost, increasing the likelihood of eventual terrorist activity. Likewise, foreign terrorist organizations can potentially draw on the destination country's existing immigrant community, the so-called diaspora. The diaspora can be seen as a network that provides its members with mutual emotional and social support and social ties that reinforce their common identity (eg Sageman 2004). Terrorist organizations associated with these diasporas (for example, because of their common religious or ethnic origin) are those that exist for the purposes of radicalization, recruitment, funding, information gathering and refuge.

4.5 SUMMARY

In summary, India is a huge country with multiple cultures. It occupies a high position in Southeast Asia. Due to the great cultural advancements that India has made, India has good sociable relations with all its neighbors. India's foreign policy is to maintain international peace, freedom, and collaboration. Its foreign policy is founded on Punch Sheila's ideology of non-aligned disarmament. Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives, Burma, China, and Afghanistan are India's immediate neighbours. All of these states have historical, religious, economic, ethnic, and linguistic ties to India.. India's main challenge was to promote internal cohesion and manage often problematic relations with neighboring countries. In India, despite many conflicts in the past, political leaders and the public still look forward to friendly relations with neighboring countries.

Common political issues such as the sharing and use of water are only addressed if they are less noticed, combined with larger security or border issues, or in the event of a natural disaster. However, water policies have far-reaching consequences for national prosperity and security. This transboundary issue is an important aspect of these countries' national development policies, but the countries involved in transboundary water sharing agreements need to do a better job of analysing and understanding it. These difficulties could be resolved in the light of experience by critical debate of these agreements, active engagement of regional organisations, and mutual understanding of shareholders. If successful, these less formal types of cooperation could ultimately make countries more willing to consider formal multilateral forums.

4.6 Exercise/ Unit End Question

1. What are the various concerns of India and Bangladesh boundary issues?
2. Discuss the key issues of disputes between India and Pakistan.
3. Highlight the immediate problems of India and China on multiple border issues.
4. Write a note on Indo-Nepalese relations.
5. What are the irritants in India-Bangladesh relations?
6. Discuss India-Sri Lanka relations with special reference to the people of Tamil origin in the Island Republic.
7. Write short note on Water Sharing Issues of India's neighbouring Countries.
8. Comment of Cross Border Terrorism.
9. Explain how terrorism can increase with increasing Migration

4.7 SUGGESTED READINGS/ REFERENCES

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